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ABSTRACT—Federal tax law divides workers into two categories depending
on the degree of control exercised over them by the service purchaser (i.e.,
the firm): employees, who are subject to direct supervision; and independent
contractors, who operate autonomously. Such worker classification
determines the administration of income tax and what it subsidizes, as well
as which nontax regulations pertain, such as workplace safety and
antidiscrimination protections. The Internal Revenue Service and other
federal agencies have codified common law agency doctrine into multifactor
balancing tests used to legally distinguish employees from independent
contractors. These tests have proved challenging to apply and costly to
enforce. Yet we know almost nothing about how firms actually classify
workers systemically and how such classification relates to the control firms
exercise over workers.
To bridge this gap between legal principles and legal practice, this
Article introduces a novel empirical analysis using a comprehensive data
source—all digitized U.S. income tax filings between 2001 and 2016. This
analysis establishes several new facts. First, using six measures of firms’
control over workers, I show that employees and contractors have grown
increasingly similar over the past two decades. I found this convergence to
be particularly pronounced among lower earning workers. I then develop a
novel theoretical framework to interpret these findings. Second, I provide
empirical evidence that the presence of financial incentives created by
government policy increases the likelihood that employees are reclassified
as contractors.
These results suggest a growing misalignment between how workers
are classified and the substance of firm–worker relationships. Put another
way, two otherwise identical workers, with relationships that feature a
similar degree of control, may end up being classified differently due to,
among other factors, their firms’ financial incentives. I conclude by
discussing the key normative questions raised by the apparent erosion of the
legal boundary delimiting contractors and employees.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. tax code divides workers into two categories: employees and
independent contractors.1 Significant tax and regulatory consequences turn
on this distinction. How a worker is classified determines, for example,

1 See Independent Contractor Defined, IRS (Feb. 24, 2022), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/smallbusinesses-self-employed/independent-contractor-defined [https://perma.cc/8NH2-RTNZ]. Officially,
the IRS recognizes four categories of business relationships between individuals providing services and
the firm purchasing services: independent contractor, employee, statutory employee, and statutory
nonemployee. Statutory Nonemployees, IRS (Apr. 26, 2022), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/smallbusinesses-self-employed/statutory-nonemployees
[https://perma.cc/3AK5-KAME];
Statutory
Employees, IRS (June 13, 2022), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/
statutory-employees [https://perma.cc/9TYE-FY27]. While there is not publicly available data regarding
the number of tax filers who are classified as statutory nonemployees for federal tax purposes, this
category comprises workers that fall within four relatively narrow categories (e.g., “an agent-driver . . .,
engaged in distributing . . . beverages”). See I.R.C. § 3121(d)(3).
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which taxes she must pay, how she must pay them, and which tax subsidies
she enjoys.2 And the consequences of this classification extend well beyond
the tax system. Tort liability, firms’ regulatory-compliance costs, worker
protection under major antidiscrimination statutes, and access to key
elements of the social safety net—to name only a few examples—all hinge
on a worker’s status.3
This legal distinction hinges on control—whether the firm or the
worker exercises more control over the work—and is built on the
foundational common law principle of agency.4 An employer is a principal
who has the right to control the work of her agent, the employee.5 A
contractor, in contrast to an employee, controls her own work and operates

2

Examples of all three of these differences abound in the Internal Revenue Code. For example,
employers are not required to pay the federal unemployment insurance tax (FUTA), a payroll tax, for
contractors. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 439 (codified as amended
at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3311). And while employees are subject to employer withholding, contractors must
make quarterly estimated tax payments. I.R.C. §§ 3401(a), 3402(a), 3501(b) (setting out employer
withholding obligations); I.R.S. Publication 505, Catalog No. 15008E (Mar. 14, 2022),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p505.pdf [https://perma.cc/J28L-EMP2] (providing guidance regarding
estimated payments); Estimated Taxes, IRS (June 13, 2022), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/smallbusinesses-self-employed/estimated-taxes [https://perma.cc/M3YK-5LUG]. Perhaps the most prominent
example of a tax subsidy that hinges on a worker’s classification is employer-sponsored health insurance.
While employees can deduct the value of premiums for employer-sponsored health insurance from their
wage tax base for Social Security and Medicare, independent contractors cannot do the same from their
self-employment tax base. Furthermore, employers’ ability to deduct their contributions to employees’
health insurance premiums from their taxes incentivized the establishment of employer group plans,
which have historically offered higher quality and less expensive coverage to employees than what
independent contractors could obtain as individuals. See Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Tax Law’s
Workplace Shift 23–25 (B.C. L. Sch. Legal Studs. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 506, 2019) (discussing
tax-system-delivered social insurance).
3 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (“An employer is subject to
liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment.”); Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C § 2611(3) (defining “employee” by cross-reference to
29 U.S.C. § 203); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, § 2(b)(1), 84 Stat.
1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 651) (discussing the goal of “reduc[ing] the number of
occupational safety and health hazards” through employer and employee efforts); see also Shu-Yi Oei,
The Trouble with Gig Talk: Choice of Narrative and the Worker Classification Fights, 81 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 120 (2018) (describing benefits available to employees under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that are not accessible to workers
classified as independent contractors).
4 Michael C. Harper, Fashioning a General Common Law for Employment in an Age of Statutes,
100 CORNELL L. REV. 1281, 1290–91 (2015). In discussing precedent relevant to the definition of
employee for the purposes of a copyright statute, the Court noted, “[W]hen we have concluded that
Congress intended terms such as ‘employee,’ ‘employer,’ and ‘scope of employment’ to be understood
in light of agency law, we have relied on the general common law of agency, rather than on the law of
any particular State, to give meaning to these terms.” Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 740 (1989) (Marshall, J., for a unanimous Court).
5 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (“[A]n employee is an agent whose principal
controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the agent’s performance of work . . . .”).
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as a distinct principal, not as an agent. Several areas of private law
incorporate the principal–agent dichotomy to align actors’ incentives.6 For
example, consider the doctrine of respondeat superior in tort law, which
holds that parties can be liable for the acts of their agents.7 The doctrine
extends a financial penalty to the principal if her agent causes harm to a third
party in the course of performance.8 This creates an incentive for the
principal to exercise control over the agent in order to ensure that the work
is done with sufficient care to avoid causing inefficient harm.9
But how is a multifaceted concept like control measured, and how do
firms determine whether it exists in sufficient quantity to make one
classification more appropriate than another? Like other complex doctrinal
line-drawing problems in tax law,10 this classification must collapse a
continuum of service contracts, ranging from employees economically
dependent on a single firm that exercises full control over their work to
autonomous independent contractors with many clients and significant scope
for entrepreneurial opportunity. And, like other complex legal standards with
dichotomous tax consequences, the line between employee and contractor is
vulnerable to manipulation by savvy taxpayers.
Another example of a test which relies on the characteristics that
commonly differentiate one legal type from another is the four-factor test
formerly used to distinguish corporations, which are taxed twice, from
partnerships, which are taxed once, as pass-through entities. If an entity
possessed characteristics traditionally associated with corporations, such as
“unlimited life” and “centralized management” in sufficient number, the
entity was subject to the corporate tax.11 In his early and influential work,
Professor David Weisbach warns against the use of such “platonic
6

See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in 3 HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1661, 1758–59 (A.J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds., 2002) (discussing how common
law creates socially efficient standards using private incentives in the context of the principal–agent
relationship). A nonexhaustive list includes torts, contracts, intellectual property, and business law.
7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04.
8 See Harper, supra note 4, at 1313–14 & n.159.
9 Note that the socially efficient outcome is achieved when the agent takes actions to prevent harm
in accordance with the reasonable actor standard to which her employer is subject (i.e., such an
internalization solves the principal–agent problem of incentive misalignment). See Kaplow & Shavell,
supra note 6, at 1758–59.
10 The line between debt and equity transactions, and the line between personal and business
expenses, are canonical examples. For additional examples of line-drawing problems in tax, see David
A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1627–
31 (1999); see also Edward Fox & Jacob Goldin, Sharp Lines and Sliding Scales in Tax Law, 73 TAX L.
REV. 237, 239 (2020) (discussing residency and childbirth date as examples of line drawing in the tax
context).
11 See Weisbach, supra note 10, at 1628. The Treasury initially created the four-factor test based on
corporate associations to distinguish between corporations and partnerships. Id.
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notions”—or ideal types—as the basis for drawing tax lines, arguing instead
for drawing lines that maximize efficiency by minimally distorting
individuals’ behavior.12 Yet there remain numerous examples of lines in tax
law that rely on easily manipulated factors, inducing taxpayers to change
their behavior in response to the line.13 The codified “line” between
contractors and employees appears to share much in common with the lines
Weisbach disparages.
It is not obvious that firms prefer one classification over the other,
holding aside tax consequences. Though employment relationships often
have associated regulatory costs,14 the optimal classification for a given
firm–worker relationship from the firm’s perspective depends on market
conditions and features of the firm’s production process.15 Put another way,
the optimal classification may hinge on a firm’s boundary, or set of activities
performed in-house. As first observed by economist Ronald Coase,
economic activity can take place either within a firm or on the market; if
imperfect information raises the cost of transacting in a market, then the
activity is more efficiently performed within the firm.16 Whether a firm
decides that work should be done by an employee (internally) or by a
contractor (externally) may turn on similar considerations.17 When a firm
values what greater control can provide—better performance measurement,
12

Id. at 1628–31.
See Fox & Goldin, supra note 10, at 286–87, 294 (discussing various examples of changes in
taxpayer behavior in response to discontinuously changing tax treatment, such as the number of days that
determine tax residency and the date of birth for child-related credits that attach to the calendar year).
14 The FLSA is often cited as an example of regulatory cost attaching to an employment relationship.
See Bruce Goldstein, Marc Linder, Laurence E. Norton II & Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Enforcing Fair
Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of
Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1146–52 (1999) (discussing myriad repercussions that firms may
incur if they violate the FLSA).
15 Cf. Anoop Madhok, Reassessing the Fundamentals and Beyond: Ronald Coase, the Transaction
Cost and Resource‐Based Theories of the Firm and the Institutional Structure of Production,
23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 535, 535–36 (2002) (“[T]he identity and strategy of a particular firm influence
how the firm’s resources interact with the transaction and how the firm chooses to govern it.”).
16
These considerations exist independent of a regulatory regime that layers compliance costs,
subsidies, protections, and evasion opportunities (or lack thereof) onto employee status. While these
additional costs (or benefits) may change the nominal wage, it is not clear that the private sector would
prefer one type of relationship to another in all contexts. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388–92 (1937) (discussing when contracting inside vs. outside the firm is
optimal).
17 Subsequent work in the literature on optimal firm size has identified three characteristics of
transactions considered critical for making this determination: frequency, uncertainty, and asset
specificity, i.e., the opportunity cost of ending a relationship. The greater each of these, the more likely
the work is to take place within the firm. Specific examples of the employee–contractor distinction have
been studied previously. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to
Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983) (discussing how firms credibly signal their ongoing
need for labor by hiring an employee instead of a contractor).
13
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workers capable of performing multiple tasks—it may tend to hire
employees to perform the work in-house, rather than contractors.18
Under current law, the IRS and other federal agencies codify the
employee–contractor line using multifactor balancing tests that involve as
many as twenty purportedly distinct factors, no set combination of which
fully determines a worker’s status.19 Due to the factors’ subjectivity and the
lack of a formula for using them to determine a worker’s status, these tests
create intrinsic indeterminacy: Two workers facing essentially similar
economic and relational circumstances may be classified differently,
opening the door to de facto electiveness in how a firm selects a worker’s
status. But how much flexibility these tests provide to firms, and the
appropriate policy response if substantial flexibility is undesirable, remains
an open question. Yet despite the critical significance of the employee–
contractor distinction,20 we have essentially zero empirical evidence about
the extent to which these multifactor tests constrain firms’ characterization
of workers.
In this Article, I conduct a novel empirical analysis to examine how
workers are classified for tax purposes in practice, yielding two positive
contributions. First, I explore the extent to which firms’ classification of
workers relates to control, and how this relationship has evolved over time.
Second, I measure whether firms classify workers as contractors in response
to policy changes that make contractor status more attractive to firms. To
conduct these analyses, I rely on a comprehensive data set that has not
previously been used to study this issue: all U.S. individual income tax
filings from 2001–2016. Using this data, I analyze how employees and
contractors differ on six characteristics that describe their relationships with
firms: income dependence, number of payers, distance to payer, tenure,
compensation volatility, and deduction-taking. I argue that these measures
serve as proxies for behavioral, relational, and financial control—the key
criteria in determining the appropriate legal characterization under federal

18 For instance, Erin Anderson and David Schmittlein consider electronic parts companies that hire
their own sales staff and those that contract with third parties. In this example, firms tend to hire their
own sales staff when individual performance is difficult to measure and when activities complementary
to sales, such as providing customer support, are valuable to the firm. Erin Anderson & David C.
Schmittlein, Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination, 15 RAND J. ECON. 385, 385–88
(1984); see also Erin Anderson, The Salesperson as Outside Agent or Employee: A Transaction Cost
Analysis, 4 MKTG. SCI. 234, 234–36 (1985) (discussing the costs incurred by a firm in instructing outside
contractors as compared to costs associated with direct sales forces).
19 IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM SS-8: DETERMINATION OF WORKER STATUS FOR PURPOSES
OF FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT TAXES AND INCOME TAX WITHHOLDING 1–4 (2014).
20 See Oei, supra note 3, at 127–29 (discussing the consequences of gig classification).
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tax law.21 Then, applying a novel analytical framework, I conduct a causal
analysis to measure how a firm’s classification decision changes in response
to a policy that makes contractors less costly to the firm than employees.
My descriptive analysis yields three distinct findings: First, in the 2016
tax year, the average employee and the average contractor were
indistinguishable on most of the measures of control that I have identified.
Second, employees and contractors have converged in these measures since
2001. And finally, low-income contractors and employees are significantly
more similar to each other than their high-income counterparts.22 For
example, most employees and contractors exhibit a similar degree of income
dependence, have a similar number of payers, and are located a similar
physical distance from their payers.23 And while contractors tend to have
shorter tenures with firms and a greater degree of compensation volatility
than do employees, these gaps have narrowed substantially over the past
fifteen years.24
I also find evidence in my causal analysis that how a firm classifies a
worker depends on the firm’s financial incentives for doing so.25 To do this,
I take advantage of a feature of Medicare’s eligibility rules that treats
employers offering health insurance to their employees differently
depending on the firm’s size. When an employee at a small firm (i.e., a firm
with twenty or fewer full-time employees) turns sixty-five, her employerprovided health insurance pays second to Medicare, saving the firm money.26
When an employee at a large firm turns sixty-five, however, her employerprovided health insurance continues to pay first, creating an incentive for the
firm to reclassify the worker as an independent contractor. Comparing the
likelihood that an employee is reclassified as a contractor after she turns
sixty-five at small versus large firms, I find that when the cost of retaining
an employee rises, a firm is more likely to classify an existing employee as
a contractor. While in economic terms the magnitude of the effect I find is
21

In fairness to the IRS, recent guidance on the twenty-factor test has reorganized the factors into
three main categories—behavioral control, financial control, and the nature of the relationship—and
provides some indication that certain factors will be given greater weight, though how much
is not clarified. Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, IRS (May 17, 2022),
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/independent-contractor-self-employedor-employee [https://perma.cc/7ZJN-VPAN]; see WILLIAM HAYS WEISSMAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF TAX
REPORTING & PRO. MGMT., SECTION 530: ITS HISTORY AND APPLICATION IN LIGHT OF THE FEDERAL
DEFINITION OF THE EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP FOR FEDERAL TAX PURPOSES 2–5 (2009)
(discussing refinement in IRS guidance to employers).
22 See infra Section III.B.
23 See infra Section III.B.2.
24 See infra Section III.B.2.
25 See infra Part IV.
26 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(h).
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modest, so too is the incentive; it is no great leap to infer that firms may
behave similarly when faced with much larger financial incentives that exist
throughout the code.27
These results suggest that the line separating employees and contractors
is blurry rather than sharp; workers facing a similar degree of control may,
depending on how a firm applies the multifactor balancing test, end up on
either side of it. And the distributional consequences of this phenomenon are
unlikely to be neutral: The similarities between employees and contractors
are much more pronounced for low-income workers who, along with female
workers, have experienced the largest growth in contractor income since
2001.28 In other words, low-income and female workers are at the greatest
risk of being misclassified as contractors, thus depriving them of important
labor protection and other benefits associated with employee status.29
A better understanding of how firms classify workers is particularly
timely, if not urgent, for two reasons. First, the underlying structure of the
labor market and key provisions of the tax code applying to contractor
income are in flux.30 “Platform firms”31 in the “gig” economy have vastly
diminished the entry costs to self-employment, while technological
innovations continue to change the manner in which firms monitor
employees and the effective size of labor markets by expanding commuting
and remote work.32 Second, a significant change introduced in the recent tax
27

One such financial incentive is that contained within the Affordable Care Act, which requires firms
with more than fifty full-time employees to provide employer-sponsored health insurance to all
employees or face tens of thousands of dollars in fines. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-148, §§ 1511–1515, 124 Stat. 119, 252–58 (2010). This threshold creates a concentrated
bright-line threshold (e.g., at fifty full-time employees there is a drastic regulatory difference) that, in
conjunction with the hefty cost of noncompliance, creates powerful incentives for firms to reduce the
number of full-time employees to locate below the threshold. One attractive way to accomplish this
relocation is to substitute contractors for workers, who, in the absence of the incentive, would be classified
as employees.
28 See Katherine Lim, Alicia Miller, Max Risch & Eleanor Wilking, Independent Contractors in the
U.S.: New Trends from 15 Years of Administrative Tax Data 4 (IRS Rsch., Applied Analytics & Stat.
Off., Working Paper, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/19rpindcontractorinus.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KW8K-RD2U].
29 See infra Part II.
30 See ARNE L. KALLEBERG, GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS: THE RISE OF POLARIZED AND PRECARIOUS
EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970S TO 2000S 21–39 (2011).
31
Platform firms are so called market-maker sites, which create value by matching service providers
with service purchasers. Prominent examples include Angi (previously Angie’s List), eBay, and
controversially, Uber and Lyft. For additional information on platform firms, see JOHN HAGEL, THE
POWER OF PLATFORMS (2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/strategy/
za_The_power_of_platforms.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6W2-VSF3].
32 Daron Acemoglu, Technical Change, Inequality, and the Labor Market, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE,
7, 30–72 (2002) (describing the effects of technology on workers of differing skill levels); Börje
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reform legislation allows contractors and other pass-through taxpayers a
generous deduction on their business income,33 which many commentators
speculate could fundamentally change the tax calculus of contracting for a
significant population of taxpayers.34 In order to develop alternatives, we
must have an adequate picture of how firms use the existing dichotomous
classification framework.
This Article also offers a basic framework for interpreting these results
and discusses the normative questions they provoke. Several hypotheses may
explain—and several policy responses may address—the observed
convergence in characteristics of control between employees and
contractors. For example, increased uncertainty about the location of the
legal boundary between employees and contractors could be remedied by
harmonizing the multiple sets of criteria that currently delineate it.35
Alternatively, if firms strategically misclassify workers, then reducing their
incentive to do so may be an appropriate policy response. More broadly, I
argue that this convergence suggests the need to reassess the dichotomous
treatment of workers by the income tax system depending on their
classification. The more employees and contractors resemble each other, the
clearer it becomes that the tax system’s differential treatment of these
groups—which can engender real differences in tax outcomes and access to
the social safety net—is without a rational basis. However, the extensive
interdependency between tax and nontax tests and case law may render
drawing a new line solely for tax purposes impracticable. I consider the
implications of my results for existing reform proposals, and the lessons that
can be drawn from the theoretical literature about legal design.
This Article is organized as follows: Part I provides background on
worker classification in the United States, including its origins, implications
for workers and firms, and existing literature on this topic. Part II considers
the origin and features of the U.S. tax filings data used for both the
descriptive and causal analyses. Part III describes the six proxy measures for
control and then asserts three findings based on distributional and timeJohansson, Julian Klaesson & Michael Olsson, Time Distances and Labor Market Integration, 81 PAPERS
REG’L SCI. 305, 305–27 (2002) (discussing how remote supervision capacity collapses geographic labor
markets).
33 I.R.C. § 199A(a).
34 See David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under
the 2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1441–43 (2019) (discussing how § 199A will result
in tax avoidance); Russell A. Hollrah & Patrick A. Hollrah, New Passthrough Deduction Creates Tax
Benefit for Self-Employed, 158 TAX NOTES 1051, 1051 (2018) (discussing eligibility for § 199A); Daniel
Shaviro, Evaluating the New US Pass-Through Rules, 2018 BRIT. TAX REV. 49, 63–64 (prospectively
discussing the effects of § 199A on forum choice and government revenues).
35 Harmonizing the definition of employee would have the ancillary benefits of making interagency
coordination easier and permitting pooling of enforcement resources.
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trends evidence. Part IV introduces a unique framework for making sense of
the descriptive findings in Part III. Part V then explores one application of
that framework by examining whether there is empirical evidence of firms
reclassifying employees in response to discontinuous financial incentives.
Part VI discusses the policy implications for tax treatment of labor income
of the current and potential alternative approaches to worker classification.
The final Part concludes.
I.

BACKGROUND ON WORKER CLASSIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES

This Part provides detail on the legal distinction between employee and
contractor relationships and discusses the tax and regulatory consequences
that follow from this distinction. The tax system’s treatment of income,
applicability of labor protections, and access to social insurance programs,
governed by a superstructure of federal statutes and agency regulations,
depend on how a worker is classified. I conclude with a brief review of
current legal and empirical scholarship studying these phenomena, situating
my study in that literature.
A. Origins of the “Employee”
The legal distinction between an employee and a contractor originates
in common law principles of vicarious liability—not tax law.36 Consider the
doctrine of respondeat superior, under which parties can be liable, or legally
responsible, for acts of their agents.37 The establishment of an employer–
employee relationship for this purpose depends on the extent to which the
purchaser of services controls, or has the right to control, how the work is
completed, such as whether or not the purchaser provides tools or dictates
the timing and sequencing of the work’s completion.38 The underlying logic
is one of incentive alignment—when an agent causes harm, the doctrine
extends a financial penalty to the party with power to instruct and supervise
the agent, and thus the ability to ensure that the work is done with adequate
effort to avoid causing harm.39
O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 722–23 (1996) (noting that “the
distinction [between employees and contractors] . . . is, in the main, a creature of the common law of
agency and torts”); see also 19 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 54:2 (4th ed. 2021) (acknowledging the
distinction between an employee and a contractor “is a matter of the common law of agency and torts”);
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 219, cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1933) (establishing the principal–agent
relationship creates the same liability rules as a master and servant relationship).
37 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
38 See id. § 7.07(3)(a) (“[A]n employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control
the manner and means of the agent’s performance of work . . . .”).
39 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 1667–73; see also Harper, supra note 4, at 1311–14
(discussing federal applications of common law standards to incentivize corporate compliance).
36
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Two structural features of this doctrine merit brief mention. As a legal
standard, rather than a legal rule, this doctrine creates a distinction ex post,
after services have been rendered.40 This does not mean that promulgation of
the distinction as a standard rather than a rule is necessarily less efficient, or
even inherently more complex.41 However, ex post creation of laws tends to
increase costs borne by individuals, who must expend resources and effort
to predict the legal characterization of their contemplated transaction.42 It
also tends to be costlier to enforce, in part because it requires the enforcer to
give meaning to the law within each factual context.43
A second feature concerns its normative content with respect to tax law.
While the doctrine clearly has normative value in the context of tort law,44 it
is less obvious how assigning different tax consequences to otherwise
identical service contracts on the basis of how much control is exercised
during performance is supported by appealing to traditional tax values such
as taxing the Haig–Simons definition of income,45 or ability to pay.46 In other
words, why should the tax treatment of income earned from work change
40 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559–60 (1992)
(describing a rule as “leaving only factual issues for the adjudicator,” such as with a rule prohibiting
“driving in excess of 55 miles per hour on expressways,” while describing a standard as “leaving both
specification of what conduct is permissible and factual issues for the adjudicator,” such as with the
standard prohibiting “driving at an excessive speed on expressways”).
41 Id. at 559–66; Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 645,
646 (1991) (describing different types of rule-based decision-making as often being generalizations); see
also Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 580–90 (1988) (providing
examples of contexts in property law where a consistently applied standard is more desirable than an
exhaustive rule).
42 Kaplow, supra note 40, at 560–61 n.5.
43 Id. at 560 & n.3.
44 I believe that the common law standard for defining an employment relationship, evolved and
refined over several centuries, is both reasonably equitable and socially efficient in the context of liability,
which features a highly skilled arbitrator who makes an ex post decision after antagonistically
incentivized parties have provided her with all relevant facts. Contrast with the tax context, where firms
(in many cases, their Human Resources Department) prospectively classify workers in accordance with
the dictate of a twenty-factor balancing test. Even for medium-sized firms, it is likely cost prohibitive to
consult legal expertise for each highly-fact-specific hiring decision.
45 Haig–Simons income is a comprehensive, use-based definition which identifies income in each
tax period as the taxpayer’s consumption plus her change in savings. Tax scholars frequently refer to this
construct in delineating which resources should be included in the income tax base. See HENRY C.
SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION (1938) (arguing that the ideal income tax system should seek to
tax the net accretion to wealth, to fairly reflect ability to pay); Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of
Income—Economic and Legal Aspects, in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54, 59 (Richard
A. Musgrage & Carl S. Shoup eds., 1959).
46 For example, in contrast with the present distinction, a pure manifestation of the “ability to pay”
principle would allow all workers, regardless of type, to deduct business expenses in order to more
accurately tax net income. For discussion of other tax distinctions lacking in normative content, see
Weisbach, supra note 10, at 1643–49 (arguing that doctrinal definitions are often “neither helpful nor
relevant to most disputes”).
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based on the worker’s relative autonomy? As will be shown, both of these
features survived importation into the federal superstructure. The nature and
effects of incorporating common law agency doctrine into the web of federal
statutes and regulations, including into tax law, are discussed in the
next Section.
B. Judicial Guidance and the Modern Analytic Tests
These common law agency principles have been codified, with
nontrivial variation, into state and federal law categorizing workers as
employees or independent contractors. These multifactor balancing tests
require the arbiter to weigh the relative importance of several aspects of the
relationship in assessing a worker’s proper characterization.47 While greater
variance exists in state law, courts recognize two legal tests in the context of
federal regulation. The first is the common law “control test,” which adheres
closely to the principles of agency law and focuses, somewhat tautologically,
on the employer’s right to control the putative employee, while the second is
the “economic realities test,” a hybrid test that considers common law factors
and the broader relationship of economic dependence between the worker
and service purchaser.48 Commentators generally consider the second test
more inclusive, but some question whether there is daylight between the two
in application.49

47

Various government authorities use a complicated multifactor balancing test to honor the common
law agency principles. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 743 (1989) (stating
“the classification of a particular hired party should be made with reference to agency law”); O’Connor
v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1997) (suggesting “courts should presume that Congress had in mind
‘the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by the common-law agency doctrine’”
(quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992))).
However, these multifactor tests differ depending on the court. See, e.g., Dykes v. DePuy, Inc.,
140 F.3d 31, 37–38 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting the First Circuit will utilize the common law test of agency
and listing twelve factors for lower courts to consider); Ahmad v. Yellow Cab Co. of New London &
Groton, 49 F. Supp. 3d 178, 183 (D. Conn. 2014) (listing the thirteen “so-called Reid factors” a court
should weigh when determining whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor); DiPilato v.
7-Eleven, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 2d 333, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (including “economic dependence among the
other factors of the common law agency test to determine whether plaintiff would be an employee for the
purposes of her ADEA and Title VII claims”).
48 Compare Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–24 (discussing the common law test), with Oestman v. Nat’l
Farmers Union Ins., 958 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir. 1992) (identifying the correct standard to apply in Title
VII actions as “a combination of the economic realities test and the common law right to control test”).
49 See, e.g., Charlotte S. Alexander, Misclassification and Antidiscrimination: An Empirical
Analysis, 101 MINN. L. REV. 907, 939 n.97 (2017) (“Decisions interpreting the meaning of employee
under the federal antidiscrimination laws illustrate the lack of any sharp distinction between the common
law test, at least as formulated in Reid and Darden, and a multifactor economic realities test.” (quoting
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmts. d–e (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft
2014))).
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Tax law relies on the first of these, the common law standard, or
“control test,” codified in IRS Revenue Ruling 87-41 as a twenty-factor test
incorporating aspects of behavioral, financial, and relational control.50
Specifically, the factors are:
(1) whether the person for whom the services are performed has the right
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)

50

to require compliance with that person’s instructions;
whether there is required worker training;
whether the worker’s services are integrated into business operations;
whether services must be personally rendered;
whether the service purchaser or the worker hire and pay any
assistants;
whether there is a continuing relationship;
whether work must be completed in set hours;
whether full-time work is required;
whether the work must be done on-site;
whether the work must be performed in a particular sequence;
whether the worker must submit regular reports;
the interval over which the worker is paid (“by the hour, week, or
month”);
whether the service purchaser pays or reimburses business or travel
expenses;
whether the service purchaser provides tools, materials, or equipment;
whether the worker invests in facilities that are not furnished by the
employer;
whether the worker can realize profit or loss;
whether the worker works for more than one firm at the same time;
whether the worker makes her services available to the general public;
whether there is a right to discharge the worker; and
whether the worker can terminate the relationship without incurring
liability.51

Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
Id. In contrast, under the FLSA, courts have applied the economic realities test. When applying
this test, courts analyze six factors to assess the relationship between the worker and business: (1) the
degree of control that the business has over the manner in which the work is performed; (2) the worker’s
opportunity for profit or loss; (3) the worker’s investment in equipment or materials; (4) the degree of
skill required for the work; (5) the permanence of the working relationship; and (6) the degree to which
the services rendered are an integral part of the business. See McFeeley v. Jackson St. Ent., LLC, 825 F.3d
235, 241 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing Schultz v. Capital Int’l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 304–05 (4th Cir. 2006));
see also Acosta v. Paragon Contractors Corp., 884 F.3d 1225, 1235 (10th Cir. 2018) (applying the same
six-factor test); Iontchev v. AAA Cab Serv., Inc., 685 F. App’x 548, 550–51 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying
the same six-factor test).
51
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Now consider the current IRS guidance provided to potential employers
in how to apply these factors to their respective relationships:
Businesses must weigh all these factors when determining whether a worker is
an employee or independent contractor. Some factors may indicate that the
worker is an employee, while other factors indicate that the worker is an
independent contractor. There is no “magic” or set number of factors that
“makes” the worker an employee or an independent contractor, and no one
factor stands alone in making this determination. Also, factors relevant in one
situation may not be relevant in another.52

On the face of it, such a large number of factors, paired with determined
regulatory agnosticism, risks creating considerable legal indeterminacy.53
Partially in recognition of this risk, Congress created a safe harbor
provision, Section 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978, that permits treating a
worker as a contractor if a “reasonable basis” exists for such treatment.54
Critics have disparaged the expansive nature of Section 530, characterizing
it as a harbor the size of the ocean.55 In addition, in recent years, the IRS has
created a significant amnesty program, which permits firms to reclassify
workers as employees going forward, provided certain conditions are met,
without fear of repercussion for previous tax periods’ (incorrect) treatment
of the worker as an independent contractor.56 Whether these efforts to
mitigate adverse consequences of “unintentional” misclassification have the
perverse consequence of encouraging intentional, or at a minimum,
opportunistic misclassification is unknown.57
C. Implications of Worker Classification
Despite the evident difficulty in interpreting and enforcing the
distinction between employees and contractors, the distinction nevertheless
has very real and definite consequences for how the tax system treats
52

Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, supra note 21.
See id. (discussing the allocation of the twenty factors into general categories of financial and
behavioral control, in addition to nature of the relationship).
54 WEISSMAN, supra note 21, at 6.
55 See Walter H. Nunnallee, Why Congress Needs to Fix the Employee/Independent Contractor Tax
Rules: Principles, Perceptions, Problems, and Proposals, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 93, 109–11 (1992) (noting
that both Congress and the Service recognized Section 530 as a “powerful safe harbor” that could lead to
taxpayer abuse); see also Russell A. Hollrah, The Tax Treatment of Independent Contractors: Where We
Are, and Where We’re Headed, 43 TAX EXEC. 329, 331 (1991) (citing a committee-report conclusion that
“the prior-audit safe harbor of section 530 creates competitive disadvantages and provides protection
against IRS reclassification to businesses that ‘blatantly’ misclassify their workers”).
56 See WEISSMAN, supra note 21, at 10–11 (demonstrating how the IRS applies Section 530 in
practice).
57 For discussion of this possibility, see Jenna Amato Moran, Independent Contractor or Employee?
Misclassification of Workers and Its Effect on the State, 28 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 105, 105–07 (2010).
53
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workers’ compensation.58 These, in turn, may affect workers’ effective tax
liability and access to tax-code-delivered subsidies for socially desirable
consumption. Significant nontax consequences follow as well, including
coverage under most U.S. labor protections. This Section provides a
summary, not a comprehensive review, of these implications.
1. Effective Tax Liability
Worker classification can potentially alter effective tax liability through
multiple channels. The most prominent avenues are through discrepancies in
the payroll tax base and incidence (i.e., relative tax burden borne by the
worker versus the firm), and differences in permitted deductions associated
with a worker’s performance. The most explicit, though relatively modest,
source of differential liability arises from contractors’ exemption from the
federal unemployment insurance program (FUTA).59 FUTA is a payroll tax
of 6% on the first $7,000 of wages and is nominally paid by the employer.60
However, the incidence of FUTA likely falls partially, or even fully, on the
employee, through lower wages.61 In short, because employers pay FUTA
taxes on their employees’ but not their contractors’ wages, and at least part
of that tax burden is likely passed on to employees through lower wages,
whether or not a given worker bears some burden of FUTA tax liability
depends on whether they are classified as a contractor or employee.
A subtler differential in liability could arise from a difference in the
incidence of Medicare and Social Security taxes for employees and
58

See Oei & Ring, supra note 2, at 667–79 (discussing the importance of deductions for personal
income).
59 Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, 68A Stat. 439 (codified as amended at
26 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3311) (subjecting only employees—and not independent contractors—to FUTA);
see, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, For Better and Worse: The Differing Income Tax Treatments of Marriage
at Different Income Levels, 93 N.C. L. REV. 783, 802 (2015) (describing the premium assistance credit
of the Tax Code’s § 36B provision, which imposes an additional Medicare tax on taxpayers with selfemployment income exceeding $250,000).
60 Topic No. 759 Form 940 – Employer’s Annual Federal Unemployment (FUTA) Tax Return –
Filing and Deposit Requirements, IRS (May 19, 2022), https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc759
[https://perma.cc/2SVD-GYK5].
61 Tax incidence refers to the relative economic burden born by parties to a tax. For example, imagine
the government levies a $1 per worker tax on my employer, Cornell. While this tax is levied on Cornell,
and Cornell remits the $1 to the government, that does not necessarily mean that Cornell is the entity
bearing the burden of the tax: Cornell sets my pretax wage, after all, and can pay me less in response to
the tax. Say Cornell reduces my wage by thirty cents. This would imply a pass-through rate of 30%:
Cornell passes on 30% of the tax’s economic burden to me, the worker, through downward wage
adjustment, while taking on 70% of the tax incidence. The incidence of an employer’s SUTA/FUTA
obligation will depend on the relative elasticities of labor demand and supply. Under certain conditions,
FUTA’s pass-through rate could exceed 100%, in which case firms would lower employee wages by
more than the firm’s payments to these programs. For an extended discussion of the theoretical
determinants of tax incidence in the employment context, see John A. Brittain, The Incidence of Social
Security Payroll Taxes, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 110, 121–23 (1971).
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contractors—governed by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)
for employees and the Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA) for
contractors. Under classical economic theory, FICA and SECA are
economically equivalent taxes, despite being remitted by different parties (in
the case of FICA, employers remit; SECA taxes are remitted by contractors
themselves).62 All else being equal, contractors and employees will bear the
same share of these payroll taxes, relative to the employer (payer);
historically, the lion’s share is thought to be borne by the worker.63 However,
an emerging empirical literature has demonstrated that nominal incidence (or
statutory incidence) may have a material effect after all.64 For example, in
contrast to the predictions of classical tax theory, an empirical study of gas
taxes found that leveling a gas tax at the wholesaler level, rather than at the
pump, changes the after-tax price paid by consumers.65
Another important difference concerns treatment of cost of business
(COB) deductions. Businesses are allowed to deduct any outlays used in the
generation of income, and contractors are entitled to the same broad-based
deductions, with few restrictions.66 Such deductions for employees are much
more limited. Before the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TJA), COB deductions for
employees were limited to unreimbursed expenses whose total itemized
deductions exceeded 2% of their adjusted gross income (AGI).67 In effect,
this meant that only employees who itemized, and had a very high ratio of
expenses to income, could exercise COB deductions. In addition, COB
deductions are notoriously difficult for the IRS to verify, which could cause

62

Cf. Wojciech Kopczuk, Justin Marion, Erich Muehlegger & Joel Slemrod, Does Tax-Collection
Invariance Hold? Evasion and the Pass-Through of State Diesel Taxes, 8 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y.
251, 251 (2016) (explaining the canonical theorem that the party remitting a tax has no impact on who
bears the tax burden, despite holding true in practice only in certain circumstances); see also Logan Allec,
What Is the Self-Employed Contributions Act (SECA) Tax?, BALANCE (Jan. 27, 2022),
https://www.thebalance.com/self-employed-contributions-act-seca-tax-5198333
[https://perma.cc/
FV95-AD73] (explaining the remitting differences between the FICA and SECA taxes).
63 For a survey of the current literature on payroll tax incidence, see Annette Bernhardt, Rosemary
L. Batt, Susan N. Houseman & Eileen Appelbaum, Domestic Outsourcing in the United States:
A Research Agenda to Assess Trends and Effects on Job Quality (Upjohn Inst., Working Paper No. 16253, 2018).
64 See Joel Slemrod, Does It Matter Who Writes the Check to the Government? The Economics of
Tax Remittance, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 251, 254–55 (2008).
65 Kopczuk et al., supra note 62, at 283–84. The authors speculate that the change in consumer
incidence is caused by the differential-evasion opportunities available to sole proprietors of gas stations,
which are audited at a much lower rate than wholesalers.
66 I.R.C. § 162. For example, an Uber driver who is classified as an independent contractor would be
entitled to deduct wear and tear to her vehicle, gas, and potentially part of her phone plan; an employee
of a black car company would not be eligible for any § 162 deductions.
67 I.R.C. § 67(a).
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contractors and employees with the same true net income to pay very
different tax rates.68
Classification also determines whether payroll and income taxes are
withheld by the employer or payer, what information is reported by the payer
to the government, and who is responsible for remitting taxes and at what
interval.69 In theory, income tax withholding should only affect a worker’s
compliance burden—and have minimal or no effect on a worker’s final tax
liability. Overwithholding may result in some time cost for an employee, in
the form of income that could have been invested throughout the year, but
contractors are, in theory, required to make quarterly estimated tax payments
on their annual liability.70 In practice, however, the lack of withholding can
have significant consequences for a contractor’s tax liability. She has more
opportunities to evade taxes,71 could go bankrupt before paying the taxes she
owes,72 or might make a retroactive decision to avoid a positive tax liability
at the end of the year.73 In short, for practical reasons, the absence of
withholding for contractors can reduce total tax liability, not simply the
timing of tax payment.
2. Access to Personal Tax Subsidies
Classification can affect workers’ access to tax subsidies for certain
types of socially desirable consumption.74 The two most important such
subsidies are provided through employer programs: the employer-sponsored

68 See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Brett Collins, Jeffrey L. Hoopes, Daniel Reck & Michael Sebastiani, Does
Credit-Card Information Reporting Improve Small-Business Tax Compliance?, 149 J. PUB. ECON. 1,
18–19 (2017) (finding information reporting did not have a significant effect on reported tax liability);
see also Bibek Adhikari, James Alm, Brett Collins, Michael Sebastiani & Eleanor Wilking, Using a
Natural Experiment in the Taxicab Industry to Analyze the Effects of Third-Party Income Reporting,
193 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 312, 330 (2022) (finding that information reporting on gross receipts led to
an offsetting increase in reported expenses for taxi drivers).
69 See generally I.R.S. Publication 15, Catalog No. 10000W (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/p15.pdf [https://perma.cc/XHW3-NKJN] (detailing employer withholding obligations). For
details on information reporting obligations with respect to contractor income, see I.R.C. §§ 6041,
6050W, 6654(c), and accompanying regulations.
70 I.R.C. § 6654.
71 See Slemrod, supra note 64, at 260 & n.24.
72 This can have serious consequences for aggregate revenue collection, in addition to the variation
it creates in tax liability among similarly situated taxpayers.
73 See, e.g., Alex Rees-Jones, Quantifying Loss-Averse Tax Manipulation, 85 REV. ECON. STUD.
1251, 1252 (2018) (arguing that having even a small, positive tax liability at time of payment affects
taxpayer effort in reducing tax liability).
74 Oei & Ring, supra note 2, at 674–79 (referring to these subsidies as “social welfare benefits
delivered through the Tax Code”). I am substantively referring to the same tax treatment but view the
difference between the terms tax subsidy, tax expenditure, and social insurance as largely semantic.
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health care and employer-sponsored retirement programs.75 While in theory
independent contractors and employees can access the same tax-favored
retirement savings vehicles, in practice, programs sponsored by employers
may be more generous or attractive along a number of dimensions.76
Similarly, prior to the Affordable Care Act (ACA), while self-employed
individuals were allowed to deduct health insurance premium payments from
gross income, there were still significant differences in financial incentives
(i.e., extent of the subsidies).77 The ACA deliberately tried to weaken the
relationship between employment and access to tax-preferred health
insurance by creating individual markets and subsidizing the individual
purchase of health plans with taxpayer income, but most evidence indicates
that employer-sponsored health insurance received comparatively larger tax
subsidies.78
3. Access to Nontax Resources
Many other federal regulations intended to protect workers apply only
to employees. For example, major antidiscrimination legislation, such as the
Anti-Discrimination Act and the FLSA, have this feature, as do several laws
that place requirements on employers for the benefit of employees, such as
the Family Medical Leave Act and the ACA.79 While by no means
exhaustive, these examples suggest the vast, and largely implicit, effect
worker classification has in defining the boundaries of the federal regulation
of work.
D. Existing Research on Alternative Work and Self-Employment
In an attempt to study the strong economic incentives and bring some
clarity to the legal ambiguity associated with worker classification, legal
75 Federal Spending: Where Does the Money Go: Federal Budget 101, NAT’L PRIORITIES PROJECT,
https://www.nationalpriorities.org/budget-basics/federal-budget-101/spending [https://perma.cc/E36HFXJU] (noting that Social Security and Medicare are the two largest mandatory expenditures, and together
constitute the largest per capita redistribution of income).
76 For example, employer-sponsored plans frequently have a matching-contribution component. For
extensive discussion of these differences, see Oei & Ring, supra note 2, at 674–77.
77 I.R.C. § 162(l); see Oei & Ring supra note 2, at 680 n.128 (documenting the sources of this tax
differential); see also David Gamage, Perverse Incentives Arising from the Tax Provisions of Healthcare
Reform: Why Further Reforms Are Needed to Prevent Avoidable Costs to Low- and Moderate-Income
Workers, 65 TAX L. REV. 669, 686 (2012) (discussing the nonequivalence of deductibility for selfemployed taxpayers purchasing health insurance).
78 It is unclear whether the ACA has fully offset the advantages afforded to employees, particularly
after the repeal of the individual mandate, which threatens to cause the individual markets to unravel. Oei
& Ring, supra note 2, at 674–77.
79 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (providing parental leave to employees); Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 253 (2010) (amending I.R.C. § 4980H to require
employers to provide full-time employees “minimum essential coverage”).
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scholars and empiricists have gone to great lengths to understand not just the
boundaries set by federal work regulations but also how workers are
operating within them. In this Section, I review recent legal scholarship and
empirical work concerning shifts in the labor market, namely the rise of the
gig economy, which has caused many workers to shift to providing services
on platforms which classify them as independent contractors. I then explain
how this Article, by comparing firm control over employees versus
contractors, fills a critical gap in our understanding of current employee–
worker scholarship.
1. Legal Scholarship
Recent legal scholarship has largely focused on the particular needs of
platform firms and the workers that provide services through them. Professor
Kathleen Thomas makes two suggestions regarding tax treatment of
platform-earned income: First, she suggests that income from platform firms
be subject to withholding; second, she argues for the creation of a
standardized COB deduction, to partially alleviate the compliance costs.80
Though Thomas is writing in the context of the gig economy, both
suggestions pertain to contractor income more generally. Taking a different
approach, Professors Shu-Yi Oei and Diane Ring consider the potential
effects that (re)classifying platform firm workers as employees would have
on tax administration.81 They argue that doing so might enhance the
transparency and salience of wages by making the after-tax wage more
apparent.82 Both approaches presuppose there is a meaningful line to be
drawn between workers on the basis of control, taking some division of labor
income between employees and contractors as a given.
Extensive literature considers the incorporation and consequences of
the employee definition into other federal statutes, particularly in studies of
employment and labor law.83 There also exists a deep body of work on
agency issues that arise in common law contexts, the review of which is
beyond the scope of this Article.84
2. Empirical Studies
In determining which individuals to include in my analysis, I
comprehensively reviewed previous empirical studies examining the rise in

80

Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1415, 1437–64 (2018).
See Oei & Ring, supra note 2, at 685–90.
82 Id. at 672.
83 See, e.g., Harper, supra note 4, at 1291–92 (discussing the incorporation of the definition within
the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60).
84 See generally Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 6, at 1702–61 (surveying the areas of law in which
well-known agency issues pertain and how they have shaped the law in those areas).
81
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contract workers. While only two surveys explicitly focus on contractor
work, several works study related groups: self-employed and alternative.
Below I will discuss the difference between these three types of workers, the
reported levels of increase in use for the three types, and how my analysis
relates to and extends our understanding of these arrangements.
The only surveys to ask questions explicitly about contractor work that
are separate from those about self-employment more generally are the
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS’s) contingent worker survey (CWS) and
Professors Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger’s CWS replication.85 Katz and
Krueger’s preferred estimate suggests a very small increase in contractors
between 2005 and 2015 of 0.2 percentage points,86 while the CWS suggests
a decrease between 2005 and 2017.87 However, the CWS does find a large
increase in contractor use between 2001 and 2005 of 0.9 percentage points.88
A group of individuals that are perhaps the most similar to, while still
being distinct from contractors, are self-employed workers, which include
both contractors (who supply labor services to firms) and sole proprietors
(who sell goods, sometimes combined with their own labor). This overlap
between contractor and self-employed workers leads to some difficulty in
studying the two groups.89 For example, individuals who provide labor as
contractors, particularly if they are misclassified employees, may not
conceive of or identify themselves to surveyors as self-employed, leading to
undercounting. Because this Article uses administrative data from thirdparty information returns (Forms 1099-MISC/K), it will include those
workers who received contractor income, but may not have filed a Schedule
C or Schedule SE, in contrast to previous studies.90
A recent paper by Professor Emile Jackson and her coauthors using
individual tax filings and information reports highlights the differences
between these two populations. The paper finds that around 33% of Form
85 Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, Understanding Trends in Alternative Work Arrangements
in the United States (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25425, 2019),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w25425/w25425.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4WGGE4AT].
86 Id.
87 Lim et al., supra note 28, at 6.
88 Id. at 14–22 (discussing how the discrepancy between the CWS report and the Katz and Krueger
study may stem from differences in administrative data and survey data results).
89 See Katharine G. Abraham, John Haltiwanger, Kristin Sandusky & James Spletzer, The Rise of the
Gig Economy: Fact or Fiction?, 109 AM. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROC. 357, 359–61 (2019).
90 Id. at 358; see also Emilie Jackson, Adam Looney & Shanthi Ramnath, The Rise of Alternative
Work Arrangements: Evidence and Implications for Tax Filing and Benefit Coverage 9 (Off. of Tax
Analysis, Dep’t of the Treasury, Working Paper No. 114, 2017), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/
131/WP-114.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QJR-9QZA] (acknowledging the limitations of using 1040-SE in a
study of contractors).
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1099-MISC recipients in 2016 did not file a Schedule SE and that around
45% of those with a Schedule SE did not receive a Form 1099-MISC,
meaning that these individuals will be included in my sample but not in the
“self-employed” population of previous papers that rely exclusively on
individuals’ tax reporting.91 Jackson’s paper also identifies small increases
in self-employment, with the increase arising from individuals with low
levels of business deductions—consistent with my general findings here.92
Similarly, my coauthors and I have previously reported that these increases
in self-employment predate the introduction of online platform economy
companies such as TaskRabbit, Uber, and Lyft.93
Finally, a number of papers have focused on a much broader population
called “alternative” workers that generally includes contractors, temp agency
employees, workers at contracting firms, and on-call workers.94 The idea
behind grouping these labor arrangements together is that they may share
substantive economic features, such as flexible hours or finite duration.
These papers find mixed results regarding the growth of such alternative
workers, reflecting the sensitivity of findings to the data source and exact
definition of nontraditional work being used. For example, using data from
a survey they administer, Katz and Krueger find a 1- to 2-percentage-point
increase in alternative work between 2000 and 201595 while the Census finds
no increase in alternative work between 2005 and 2017.96 This Article
examines a subset of these workers whom I characterize as contractors.
II. METHODOLOGY
This Part describes the general features of the data and the details of the
strategy I use to identify contractor relationships. In addition, I provide the
details of, and a justification for, the construction of the samples used in the
descriptive and causal analyses, respectively.
The data used in this analysis is more complete and accurate, and less
subject to error, than the sources used by the existing literature on contracting
and alternative work arrangements.97 Yet identifying contractors in this data
91

Jackson et al., supra note 90, at 4–17.
Id.
93 Lim et al., supra note 28, at 17–19 (finding that the rise in contractor arrangements started prior to
the 2010s).
94 See, e.g., Katz & Krueger, supra note 85 (describing trends in alternative work arrangements); see
also Jackson et al., supra note 90, at 6–8 (enumerating multiple other recent studies in this area).
95 Katz & Krueger, supra note 85, at 2–3.
96 Lim et al., supra note 28, at 6.
97 The data is remarkably complete because, unlike with surveys, there is no sampling—almost all
taxpayers must file a tax return. IRS data quality results in part from the incentive of individuals to provide
92
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is still not straightforward. I build on the data construction and parsing efforts
detailed in a related project.98
A. Methods of Identifying Relationships with U.S. Tax Data
The U.S. Department of the Treasury maintains a centralized, relational
database99 of digitized tax-form filings. Referred to as the Compliance Data
Warehouse (CDW), this database contains information from all returns filed
by U.S. taxpayers from tax year 2001 onward.100 The CDW serves multiple
functions. It primarily allows individual enforcement and collections officers
to query an individual taxpayer’s filing and payment history as part of
collection efforts.101 In addition, government researchers use the CDW
internally to make revenue forecasts and to simulate the likely effects of
various administrative policies.102 I conduct this analysis under the auspices
of a small academic partnership program managed by the Research, Applied
Analytics, and Statistics Division of the IRS (RAAS).103

the government with accurate information on their tax returns, under pain of penalty for inaccuracy. In
contrast, there are no consequences to making a mistake on a survey or lying to a surveyor. Finally, since
the IRS uses this data regularly for routine enforcement purposes, systematic errors, such as misreading
of numerals or blanks, are more likely to have been corrected or at least identified.
98 See Lim et al., supra note 28, at 7–14.
99 A “relational database” is a database that separately stores various data sets in a way in which the
data sets can be queried or joined without being loaded into active memory. Critically, compared with a
traditional or “static” dataset, this configuration allows for variables to exist at different observation
levels, which means form-level, individual-level and firm-level information can be easily combined and
manipulated. The manner in which this data is structured allows the researcher to join data inputs at
different levels of observation. For example, it permits linking multiple individual employees to a single
firm.
100 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2017 ANNUAL PRIVACY, DATA MINING, AND SECTION 803
REPORTS 23 (2017), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/236/annual-privacy-data-mining-report-andsection-803-report-final-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5CB-XFCP] (acknowledging that the CDW leverages
data from taxpayers, employers, other federal agencies and other IRS sources); see also Steven Toscher
& Daniel Kellerman, The Impact of “Big Data” on IRS Civil and Criminal Tax Enforcement, L.A. LAW.,
July–Aug. 2019, at 14, 15–16 (discussing the evolution of the CDW and how it uses tax data).
101 See IRS, PCLIA #5519 REPORT (2020), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pia/cdw-pia.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TUM3-9FDS] (explaining the method for migrating data into the CDW and preparing
the data for analysis); see also Toscher & Kellerman, supra note 100, at 14 (noting “[t]he CDW enabled
the IRS to run the . . . data through algorithms to perform predictive analysis, including identifying fraud
in areas such as the earned income tax credit and identifying trends”).
102 See ROBIN RAPPAPORT & JEFF BUTLER, IRS OFF. OF RSCH., LOADING METADATA TO THE IRS
COMPLIANCE DATA WAREHOUSE (CDW) WEBSITE: FROM SPREADSHEET TO DATABASE USING SAS®
MACROS AND PROC SQL 2 (2012), https://www.lexjansen.com/nesug/nesug12/bb/bb02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A3LM-8UFF] (discussing users’ capacity “to generate frequency tables, statistical
distributions, trends, and geographic maps for virtually any column in the database”).
103 The program is jointly sponsored by RAAS, the Statistics of Income Division and Office of Tax
Analysis at the Department of the Treasury; project proposals are selected in a competitive bid process
on their basis to inform tax policy and tax administration decision-makers.
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To conduct my analysis, I construct two data sets from all digitized
tax filings contained in the CDW for tax years 2001–2016. I combine
variables from several different tax forms, including tax returns used by
individuals and firms to report their tax liability to the government and
“information returns” or mandatory forms which notify the tax agency and
the taxpayer about potential tax liability.104 The first data set (“descriptive
analysis sample”) is a repeated cross section of worker–firm relationships,
represented by three information reports: Forms W-2, 1099-MISC, and
1099-K. For each form type, and within each tax year, I draw a 2% random
sample from these reports (Table 1). I then incorporate additional
information about the workers and firms, including data from workers’
income tax returns. Together, these linkages create a rich sample of worker–
firm relationships, the unit of analysis for this study.
The second data set (“causal analysis sample”) is a panel data set of
individuals drawn from a 5% sample of employees at age sixty, who are then
followed through subsequent tax years. As in the descriptive analysis sample,
I link these workers to additional information about them and the firms that
employ them. This data set allows me to observe how employees transition
to being contractors with the same firm over time, something that data
limitations have prevented in previous studies.105

104 For example, individual U.S. households report their tax liability on Form 1040 or, if they have
self-employment income, Form 1040-SE. Similarly, corporations may file a Form 1120 to report annual
income. In contrast, Form W-2 is an information return the government requires employers to file, with
a copy sent to the individual employee, documenting the amount in wages paid to the employee over the
course of the tax year. While Form W-2 is likely the most familiar information report, universities, health
insurance providers and financial institutions, among others, are also required to file information returns.
105 See infra Section V.B.
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214,954,848
219,162,656
225,115,152
229,876,944
232,245,504
225,198,048
205,984,608
207,119,952
210,768,352

216,730,448
222,278,800
230,444,992
238,122,256
243,336,192

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

28,586,900

27,638,650

27,110,550

26,303,850

26,101,150

25,489,650

24,610,150

24,323,900

25,939,350

26,313,150

26,119,150

25,142,300

25,135,800

24,423,900

23,836,750

3,874,750

2,437,000

1,981,150

1,714,850

1,811,200

1,455,000

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

(3)

1099-K

4,866,724

4,762,445

4,608,900

4,445,576

4,334,609

4,215,367

4,142,399

4,119,692

4,503,961

4,644,910

4,597,539

4,502,303

4,383,253

4,299,097

4,375,565

4,580,836

(4)

W-2

571,738

552,773

542,211

526,077

522,023

509,793

492,203

486,478

518,787

526,263

522,383

502,846

502,716

488,478

476,735

455,833

(5)

1099-MISC

Sample Size

77,495

48,740

39,623

34,297

36,224

29,100

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

(6)

1099-K

88.8

90.0

90.6

91.1

91.6

92.1

91.8

91.5

91.6

92.1

90.8

90.6

90.7

90.9

90.8

90.8

(7)

Employee
to 1040

86.8

88.2

89.1

89.7

90.1

90.8

91.0

90.9

90.7

91.7

90.1

89.9

89.7

90.4

91.6

92.1

(8)

Contractor
to 1040

74.8

75.8

76.7

77.0

77.0

77.3

77.8

78.2

76.9

77.7

76.5

76.1

74.7

74.0

73.2

72.8

(9)

Contractor
to Sch. C.

Match Rates (%)

Note. All fully digitized tax years are used in this analysis. The first three columns provide counts of the universe for each form type,
while the middle three columns provide counts of the year-stratified 2% sample for each form type. The only restrictions imposed in
the initial sampling were a positive amount on the form and that the taxpayer was not deceased in the tax year in which the form was
issued. Note that Form 1099-K was not introduced until 2011. The last three columns provide match rates from the information report
to the payee’s personal income tax filing (Form 1040). While the match rates to the Form 1040 between contractor and employees are
largely similar, the match rates to the 1040 Schedule C are lower. This could be for several reasons. First, many taxpayers with
contractor income (especially small amounts of contractor income) do not know that they must file a Schedule C form, and instead
report it elsewhere on the 1040, or fail to report it.Second, prior to 2006, Schedule C was filed under the primary filer’s Social Security
Number (SSN), even if their spouse had earned the income. This requires an additional link (between the primary filer SSN and the
payee SSN) that can reduce the match rate.

218,778,256

2002

22,791,650

(2)

(1)
229,041,792

1099-MISC

W-2

2001

Year

Universe Size

TABLE 1: SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION AND MATCH RATES
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There are several notable advantages to using tax-return data to study
questions related to independent contractors. First, it is possible to link
independent contractors to all firms that compensate them through
their information reports, namely Forms 1099-MISC and 1099-K. While
the Census provides a panel of firm–employee relationships, sole
proprietorships, and partnerships, it is not possible to link the subset of sole
proprietors who are unincorporated independent contractors to payers.106
Previous research has found that a large fraction of 1099-MISC recipients
cannot be linked to Schedule C self-employment income reports.107 The tax
data allows me to observe all Schedule C filers and 1099-MISC/K recipients,
and to leverage the link (or missing link) between these reports to investigate
the multifaceted nature of contract labor and how it has changed over time.
Using the tax data, not only am I able to observe the universe of selfemployed individuals, but I am also able to link the self-employed
contractors with the firms that contract them.108 This firm–worker link is
central to the research questions explored here.
Second, using tax return data allows me to link workers to their
individual income tax returns (Form 1040). Making this link allows me to
observe information relevant to the nature of the firm–worker relationship
within the tax year, such as the degree to which the worker relies on income
from the firm, as well as information that spans tax years, such as the length
of time a worker has been associated with a specific firm and whether the
same worker has switched classifications while working for the firm.
Form 1040 also contains various outcome variables of interest: detailed
information on deduction-taking, total reported income, and some
information on nonwage compensation, such as the employer’s contribution
to insurance or employer provided childcare. Finally, I can access a rich
set of firm characteristics by linking employing firms to their businessincome returns and other filings. These forms include information on firm
deductions for employee benefits, which I use in the causal analysis to
confirm that larger firms that respond to the discontinuous cost threshold
arising from their employee’s Medicare eligibility were indeed providing
employer-sponsored health insurance.109
106

The Census maintains a high-quality, restricted panel dataset of employees and firms—the
Longitudinal Employer–Household Dynamics—which combines administrative and survey data sources
to help researchers understand changes in employer–employee relationships over time. However, only
traditional employee–employer relationships are tracked, not contractors. See Jackson et al., supra note
90, at 12 (discussing limitations of Census datasets for studying alternative work arrangements).
107 Id. at 11.
108 The term “universe” in this context is used in the statistical sense and refers to data which
comprises the entire population.
109 See infra Part V.
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There are also some important drawbacks to this data. I am unable to
observe how many hours someone has worked, which makes it difficult to
directly compare compensation across workers. Also, for regulations that are
not enforced by the IRS, such as the Medicare eligibility threshold that I use
in the causal analysis, I am unable to observe the exact firm-size measure
used by the regulatory agency to determine whether the firm is subject to the
regulation. I therefore rely on data-driven proxies for these measures.
Additionally, I observe firm–worker matches at the level of the employer
identification number (EIN), as opposed to the establishment or firm, which
are often used in linked firm–employee data sets.110 Firms can have multiple
EINs and EINs can change over time.111
B. Method of Identifying Contractor Income
Central to the analyses in this Article is the need to identify independent
contractors in the tax data. To do this, I limit the sample of Form 1099-MISC
recipients to those with positive amounts of nonemployee compensation,
reported in box 7 of the form. The IRS requires that businesses issue Form
1099-MISC to individuals or other businesses for services provided by
someone who is not an employee of the issuing business.112 I start with a 2%
annual cross section of all recipients for each tax year from 2001 to 2016.
However, because I am trying to identify individuals providing services, I
refine the sample to exclude recipients who employ others. I do this for two
reasons. First, conceptually, I consider employer businesses distinct from
contractors because their activity rises above merely an individual providing
their own labor services to a firm. Second, it is not possible to determine
whether the employee or the owner was providing labor services to the
110 As is common practice in the economics literature, I use “firm” to mean entity (e.g., a
corporation)—in contrast, an establishment is a work site. A single firm may comprise multiple
establishments. The EIN is assigned at the firm level, but in some cases, multiple EINs might be issued
to a single large corporation. See IRS, EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER: UNDERSTANDING YOUR
EIN 2 (2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1635.pdf [https://perma.cc/X5DF-T8CC] (“You should
have only one EIN for the same business entity.”); id. at 5 (“You will need a new EIN if . . . [y]ou are a
subsidiary of a corporation and currently use the parent’s corporate EIN.”).
111 Multiple-EIN assignment is rare for small- and medium-sized firms (i.e., firms with fewer than
100 employees), which constitute 95% of the firms in my sample.
112 Instructions for Forms 1099-MISC and 1099-NEC (01/2022), IRS (Jan. 5, 2022),
https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i1099mec [https://perma.cc/PK59-BJ4F]; see also Am I Required to File
a Form 1099 or Other Information Return?, IRS (June 9, 2022), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/
small-businesses-self-employed/am-i-required-to-file-a-form-1099-or-other-information-return
[https://perma.cc/68MW-U9WL] (requiring a Form 1099-MISC for payments for “[s]ervices performed
by someone who is not [the business’s] employee”). Note that, during the years of my sample, only Form
1099-MISC was required by the IRS. Form 1099-NEC was reintroduced by the IRS in 2020. See What Is
Form 1099-NEC?, TURBOTAX (July 22, 2022, 10:09 AM), https://turbotax.intuit.com/tax-tips/irs-taxforms/what-is-form-1099-nec/L5fbwIFSn [https://perma.cc/Z2B9-MG29].
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business issuing the Form 1099-MISC. For example, a Form 1099-MISC
could be issued to a catering company with many employees or to a law firm
for attorney services. The resulting samples of employee and contractor
relationships are summarized in Table 2.
The recently introduced Form 1099-K provides an additional way to
identify taxpayers with contractor income. Form 1099-K was introduced in
2011 as an information report on credit card transactions and third-party
payments that exceed either $20,000 or 200 transactions in a year.113
Contractors who receive compensation in the form of credit card payments
may have part or all of their contract income reported on Form 1099-K rather
than Form 1099-MISC.114 In order to include contractors for whom all of
their contract income is reported on a Form 1099-K, I draw a separate 2%
sample of Form 1099-K recipients in each tax year from 2011 to 2016.
Many Form 1099-K recipients will not be considered contractors because
these forms are issued to any business that accepts credit cards as payment
for goods or services, underscoring the importance of using additional
information on recipients to identify contractors. For sampled Form 1099MISC recipients, I also link to any Forms 1099-K that they receive in order
to count total contractor income for individuals receiving both forms.
Analogously, for sampled Form 1099-K recipients, I link to any Forms 1099MISC received.
Figure 1 shows that the total number of Form 1099-MISC/K recipients
has increased over the sample period. The number of Form 1099-MISC
recipients increased from approximately 18 to 26 million from 2001 to 2016.
When including Forms 1099-K, there were more than 30 million recipients
in 2016. Figure 2 shows the relative distributions of compensation for each
type of relationship. Note the distinction between compensation per worker–
firm relationship and aggregate compensation per worker (i.e., the sum of all
the income reported on all W2s and 1099s an individual receives). Later
analysis will incorporate adjusted gross income, which is akin to net
compensation (i.e., net of deductions).

113

See Slemrod et al., supra note 64, at 2–3 (discussing the context and purpose of Form 1099-K).
See Adhikari et al., supra note 68, at 313–15 (exploring partial income reporting using data from
Form 1099-K for taxi drivers).
114
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TABLE 2: RELATIONSHIP SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

Employee Relationships

Contractor Relationships

Number

Median
Compensation

Median
AGI

% with
Contractor
Income

Number

Median
Compensation

Median
AGI

% with
Employee
Income

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

2001

2,291,334

19,100

31,300

2002

2,186,041

19,300

32,200

6

455,833

9,000

42,100

52

6

476,735

9,300

41,600

52

2003

2,148,294

19,800

33,100

6

488,478

9,500

42,100

51

2004

2,189,432

2005

2,251,989

20,400

34,000

7

502,716

9,700

43,900

52

20,900

34,700

7

502,846

10,000

45,500

52

2006
2007

2,297,672

21,700

35,900

7

522,383

10,300

46,700

52

2,322,489

22,500

36,400

7

526,263

10,200

46,900

53

2008

2,253,428

23,500

38,300

7

518,787

9,600

46,900

53

2009

2,060,080

23,900

39,900

6

486,478

9,200

44,700

51

2010

2,071,026

23,800

40,000

7

492,203

9,400

45,800

51

2011

2,109,442

24,300

39,800

7

538,893

10,400

45,500

50

2012

2,168,265

24,600

40,000

7

558,247

10,600

46,800

50

2013

2,220,676

24,800

39,900

7

560,374

10,900

47,500

50

2014

2,306,441

25,300

40,300

7

581,834

11,000

48,400

51

2015

2,381,658

26,100

40,600

8

601,513

10,900

48,600

52

Year

2016 2,433,321
26,500
41,000
8
649,233
10,900
47,500
53
Note. This table provides additional information about the year-stratified 2% sample for each relationship type. Column
2 and Column 6 are based off only the observations that could be linked to the individual’s Form 1040 and have been
rounded to the nearest hundred dollars to protect individual taxpayer identity; the other columns are not subject to this
restriction. As expected, the median compensation (at the form level) for employees is significantly higher than for
contractors, but the household adjusted gross income (AGI) is higher for contractors. AGI is equal to gross income
minus adjustments for cost of earning income, and thus more accurately reflects household resources. This reflects the
fact that, in levels, high-income contractors are the larger group, despite the fact that low-income contractors are the
fastest growing group throughout the sample period.115 Notably, contractors are considerably more likely to have wage
income than employees are to have contractor income, which may reflect that contractor income is supplementary in
some households.

115 For additional demographic information about contractor households and their relative reliance
on contractor income, see Lim et al., supra note 28.

759

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

Change Since Tax Year 2001 (2001 = 100)

FIGURE 1: CHANGE IN NUMBER OF RELATIONSHIPS AND RECIPIENTS SINCE 2001,
BY CLASSIFICATION, 2001–2015
1099-MISC
Forms

140

1099-MISC
Recipients

130
120
110

W-2
Recipients
W-2
Forms

100
90
2000

2005

2010
2015
Tax Year
Note. Figure 1 shows the dramatic increase in contractor relationships and Form 1099-MISC recipients relative to
employee relationships and Form W-2 recipients since 2001. These counts are based on the universe of tax filings:
Because payers only issue up to a single form of each type to a payee each tax year, each form constitutes a unique
payer–payee relationship. The number of recipients refers to the number of unique individual payees who were issued
at least one form of that type. Several points are worth noting. First, the number of contractor relationships has grown
from approximately 38 to 57 million between 2001 and 2015, an increase of over 40%; most of this growth has occurred
since 2009. Over the same period, the number of employee relationships declined, reaching its nadir at 2009, the first
full tax year of the financial crisis. The number of employee relationships surpassed 2001 levels again only in 2015.
Second, for contractors, the number of relationships and the number of workers tracked until 2009, and then began to
diverge, suggesting that contractors may have begun picking up additional payers in the wake of the recovery and at a
faster rate than did employees. This period also coincides with an increase in gig-economy firms, although most of
those firms report compensation on Form 1099-K, which is not included.
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FIGURE 2: HISTOGRAM OF COMPENSATION, BY CLASSIFICATION, IN 2016

Fraction of the Sample
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Note. Figure 2 shows the distributions of annual compensation—wages for employees, nonemployment
compensation for contractors—of the sampled relationships. For readability, only compensations below the 95th
percentile for wages ($100,700) are plotted. These distributions differ significantly at virtually every point. The
median nonemployment compensation issued to contractors is $3300, over $10,000 dollars lower than the median
wage issued to employees ($13,500). This difference is even more pronounced at the 75th percentile, which is
$39,200 for employees but only $10,900 for contractors.

III. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF WORK RELATIONSHIPS
Multiple criteria determine the classification of a worker as an
employee or independent contractor, as codified in the multifactor balancing
test, and one might argue that such criteria defy quantification in any
respect.116 But this view is misguided: while any of the available proxy
measures for the criteria may provide insufficient information to positively
determine a worker’s status in a given relationship within an acceptable
margin of error, the aggregate distributions of these measures should be
distinguishable among employees and contractors, provided that the
measures meaningfully relate to the legal standard. Put differently, while any
116 However, several for-profit companies have had success in marketing algorithms that can predict
complex legal outcomes, including multifactor balancing tests. Benjamin Alarie, INSIGHT: Turning
Standards into Rules—Part 3: Behavioral Control Factors in Employee vs. Independent Contractor
Decisions, BLOOMBERG TAX (Dec. 14, 2018, 8:39 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-taxreport/insight-turning-standards-into-rulespart-3-behavioral-control-factors-in-employee-vsindependent-contractor-decisions [https://perma.cc/2HW2-W2QP].
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specific worker’s classification may not turn on any or all of the available
proxy measures, we should expect the average contractor to differ
significantly from the average employee on each.
This Part puts this theory to the test. First, I describe six quantitative
measures that suggest the nature of a worker’s legal relationship with her
firm. Second, I present three main findings from an analysis of U.S. tax
filings data. The average employee and contractor in tax year 2016 are
strikingly similar on all metrics, though important differences emerge in the
extremes of the distribution. Moreover, employees and contractors have
converged, or become more similar, on four of the five common metrics
since 2001. Finally, this convergence has not been shared equally across the
income distribution—lower income employees and contractors have rapidly
become virtually indistinguishable, whereas the differences among their
higher-income counterparts remain pronounced.
A. Quantitative Measures Characterizing Work Relationships
As discussed in Section I.B, in determining a worker’s status for tax
purposes, courts have historically relied on a common law test, codified by
the IRS into twenty factors.117 This test, and common law more generally,
considers and weighs many different facets of the relationship between the
worker and the firm. Although there are slight differences in application,
many other federal statutes feature a version of the common law test,118 and
several federal agencies interpret it.119 For example, the Supreme Court has
defined an employee under the Employment Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA) by the common law standard.120
While the IRS enumerated specific factors, it did not do so exclusively: “factors in addition to the
20 factors . . . may be relevant” and “all facts must be examined.” JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH
CONG., JCX-26-07, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO WORKER CLASSIFICATION FOR
FEDERAL TAX PURPOSES 3–5 (2007). Recently, the IRS has refined these factors, collapsing the factors
into three broad categories of control: behavioral control, financial control, and the nature of the
relationship. Id. at 5; I.R.S. Publication 15-A, Catalog No. 21453T (Jan. 13, 2022), https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/p15a.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CHS-WU4M].
118 With the notable exception of the FLSA, which employs the economic realities test. See supra
note 51.
119 See Harper, supra note 4, at 1294–301 (listing federal agencies whose enforcement activities
require defining “employee”).
120 The leading case providing guidance for how to distinguish between employees and independent
contractors under ERISA is Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). In
Darden, the Supreme Court applied a common law control test from agency law to determine whether a
worker qualified as an employee or an independent contractor. Id. at 323–24. This test, which examines
an array of factors to assess the hiring party’s control over the worker, is similar to the IRS control test.
See Tracy Snow, Note, Balancing the ERISA Seesaw: A Targeted Approach to Remedying the Problem
of Worker Misclassification in the Employee Benefits Context, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1237, 1248
(2011).
117
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Drawing on these commonalities and their discussion in relevant case
law, I have identified six quantitative metrics that correspond either directly
or indirectly to the combination of behavioral, financial, and relational
factors set forth by the IRS:
(1) income dependence—how much of an independent contractor’s
earnings come from a single firm?
(2) number of payers—how many firms pay an independent contractor?
(3) distance—how far from a firm does an independent contractor live?
(4) tenure—over how many tax periods is an independent contractor paid
by a firm?
(5) compensation volatility—for relationships that span multiple tax years,
how much does an independent contractor’s compensation vary year to
year?
(6) amount and nature of deductions—how many deductions are claimed
by an independent contractor, or did the contractor realize a loss, and
are an independent contractor’s deductions primarily for “capital-like”
expenses or those typically associated with providing labor services?

For criteria (1)–(5), I also define their analog pertaining to employees.
For example, when defining the number of payers—criterion (2)—for
employees, I measure this by the number of firms issuing Forms W-2 to that
worker. Then, I document patterns over time in each of these characteristics,
separately for independent contractors and employees. These time series
plots provide initial evidence about the degree to which the economic reality
faced by each type of worker differs, and whether those differences have
grown larger or smaller over time. Below, I describe each of these six metrics
in more detail and support their use as proxies for firm control.
1. Income Dependence
While it is not one of the factors included in the IRS twenty-factor test,
there are several references in case law to a worker’s “economic
independence” as a factor weighing in favor of contractor status. For
example, to distinguish an employee from an independent contractor, the
Department of Labor issued a regulation stating that “an employee, as
distinguished from a person who is engaged in a business of his or her own,
is one who, as a matter of economic reality . . . is dependent on the business
which he or she serves.”121 The regulations do not specify what it means to
be “dependent on” a business; however, in another context, the Fourth
Circuit has indicated that “dependent on” refers to the extent to which a
121 WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., FACT SHEET #13: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (2008), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/
legacy/files/whdfs13.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3NG-V8ZZ].
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worker’s compensation depends on the purported employer versus the
worker’s other business opportunities or investments.122
The degree to which a worker depends upon a single firm has
significant implications for that worker’s outcomes. Unlike a worker who
provides her services to multiple firms and whose compensation is spread
more evenly across them, a worker dependent upon a single firm faces much
greater income risk if that relationship terminates. Similarly, such a worker
often accumulates human capital specific to that firm, which gives the firm
a stronger bargaining position since those skills may be nontransferable to
other firms.
One could measure in several different ways the degree to which a
worker is “economically dependent” on a given relationship with a firm, as
articulated by the case law. One of the most straightforward is the
compensation received from a particular relationship as a share of total
compensation the worker received in that tax year—that is, income
dependence. To illustrate, consider an independent contractor relationship
with Firm A in tax year Y. Suppose this contractor also worked for Firm B
in year Y. Her income dependence in year Y would be equal to the
compensation she received from Firm A divided by the sum of her
compensation for the tax year from Firm A plus the compensation she
received from Firm B. An attractive feature of this particular construction is
that its analog can easily be calculated for employees. In addition, because it
is a percentage (i.e., a measure bounded between zero and one), rather than
an absolute measure of compensation, the fact that contractor compensation
is gross, not yet factoring in deductible business expenses, and employee
compensation is net does not significantly affect the interpretation.
2. Number of Payers
The second metric I analyze is the number of unique payers from which
the worker/payee receives compensation within the same tax year. The
original IRS twenty-factor test, used for most of the sample period, explicitly
included “Working for more than one firm at a time” as one of its twenty
factors indicative of a contractor relationship, elaborating that “[i]f a worker
performs more than de minimis services for multiple firms at the same time,
that generally indicates independent contractor status.”123 This measure is
also implicitly related to two other factors in the original twenty-factor test:
122

See, e.g., McFeeley v. Jackson St. Ent., LLC, 825 F.3d 235, 243 (4th Cir. 2016) (“The more the
worker’s earnings depend on his own managerial capacity rather than the company’s, and the more he is
personally invested in the capital and labor of the enterprise, the less the worker is ‘economically
dependent on the business’ and the more he is ‘in business for himself’ and hence an independent
contractor.” (quoting Schultz v. Cap. Int’l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 2006))).
123 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 117, at 4.
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whether the worker makes her services available to the public, and whether
the relationship demands full-time work.124 A worker with forty or fifty
payers is much more likely to provide services to the public at large, and
each relationship is unlikely to demand full-time work, relative to a worker
with only one or two payers.
This metric is closely related to, but distinct from, income
dependence.125 A worker who receives compensation from multiple firms is,
all else being equal, less likely to depend on any single firm for her
compensation. However, the number of payers may be informative even if
income dependency is held fixed, as more payers suggests that the worker
has built a network of clients that they may use to generate business if their
primary client terminates the relationship.
3. Distance to Payer
In general, annualized tax data is less informative about factors
concerning behavioral control than relational or financial control. For
example, it is not possible to use tax data to observe the nature and extent of
training or instruction a worker receives about how to perform a given task.126
However, an important indicator of behavioral control under IRS guidance
is whether the work is performed on-site, where the employer can exert
greater control over the environment.127
While I cannot directly observe whether the worker works on-site, I can
observe a variable that is correlated with on-site work: the distance between
the payer and the payee. At low values—say, between zero and fifty miles—
the distance between the payer and the payee is unlikely to be informative
about whether work is performed on-site, let alone the degree of behavioral
control retained by the firm. However, at high enough values, where the
distances likely exceed what is considered feasible for a regular commute,

124 Id. at 4–5 (“If the worker must devote substantially full time to the business of the person for
whom services are performed, this indicates employee status. An independent contractor is free to work
when and for whom he or she chooses.”).
125 As an example, consider two sampled contractor relationships—Contractor 1–Firm A, and
Contractor 2–Firm D (recall that the sampling unit of this analysis is the relationship, not the worker).
Contractor 1 also has relationships with Firms B and C, while Contractor 2 also has a relationship with
Firm E. Contractor 1 derives equal compensation from each of her relationships, or one-third from each
firm. Contractor 2 derives one-third of her income from Firm D and the remaining two-thirds from Firm
E. Therefore, the two sampled relationships—Contractor 1–Firm A, Contractor 2–Firm D—each have
the same value of income dependence (one-third) but have different numbers of payers (three versus two).
126 Historically, survey data with very small sample sizes has been used to evaluate behavioral
control, predominantly in the field of sociology.
127 See Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (“If the work is performed on the premises of the person
or persons for whom the services are performed, that factor suggests control over the worker . . . .”).
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this measure may be highly predictive of whether work is performed onsite.128
Of course, physical proximity is no longer a necessary condition for
supervision for every type of employment. Employers may use technology
that permits them to closely monitor work at great distance, such as computer
software that monitors activity on a company’s network by workers logged
in remotely or video conference calls. However, because there are a range of
industries where work is more likely to take place on-site, such as
manufacturing, physical proximity is arguably still informative as to the
degree of control or direct supervision that a payer can exercise over a service
provider.
To create a measure of the physical distance between the worker’s home
and the work site, I measure the Cartesian (“as the crow flies”) distance in
miles between the payer’s zip code and the worker’s address. This measure
is quite coarse, not taking into account actual commuting time by car
or public transportation. There are also several caveats regarding the
construction of this measure. First, the payer’s address is associated with an
EIN, which is an entity-level identifier rather than an identifier for the actual
work site.129 For many firms, particularly small firms, the address of the EIN
and the address of the work site are one and the same. For some firms,
however, the EIN address may be that of a corporate headquarters, rather
than the site to which a worker might report. To limit the effect of these cases
on the analysis, I restrict the sample to payers and payees within the same
state. On its own, this distance measure is unlikely to fully convey the degree
of supervision exercised by a firm over a worker, but when combined with
the other measures presented here, it may reinforce the trends of the more
informative metrics.
4. Tenure with Payer
Historically, contractors have been engaged to perform services for a
particular project to be completed within a finite amount of time, rather than

128 The American Community Time Use Survey has tracked commuting times for several decades;
for the period overlapping with my analysis years, the average commuting time to “one’s primary
employment” gradually increased to just under thirty minutes each way, implying that an average
employee commuter lives approximately seventeen miles from their primary residence. CHARLYNN
BURD, MICHAEL BURROWS & BRIAN MCKENZIE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TRAVEL TIME TO WORK IN THE
UNITED STATES: 2019, at 5 tbl.3 (2021), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/
publications/2021/acs/acs-47.pdf [https://perma.cc/DGE3-FPVE]. A fifty-mile commute would place the
individual at the 90th percentile. Note that these statistics are likely to differ significantly compared to
years affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.
129 Employer ID Numbers, IRS (June 22, 2022), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businessesself-employed/employer-id-numbers [https://perma.cc/6X4F-3WYJ].
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retained by firms indefinitely.130 The IRS twenty-factor test includes
“[c]ontinui[ty of] relationship” as a potential indicator of employee status.131
Courts have also consistently referenced the “permanence of the working
relationship” in applying the hybrid common law test and the economic
realities test in the context of federal statutes.132
Like income dependence, the duration of a relationship between a
worker and a firm can significantly affect a worker’s labor-market outcomes.
First, the longer a worker stays at a job, on average, the less likely she is to
leave in any given year.133 Second, the longer a worker stays at a job, on
average, the higher her earnings will be.134 As a worker–firm relationship
progresses, both parties learn more about each other and, if they choose to
continue the relationship, it is less likely that new information will come to
light that causes either of them to reconsider those choices.
Economists refer to the duration of employment as “tenure,” and it can
be measured in several different ways. In the tax data, I measure it in two
ways. First, for the 2016 sample, I define tenure as the number of consecutive
tax years the relationship existed prior to 2016. For example, if an employee
relationship is sampled in 2016, I gather additional data about whether the
same firm also issued the same employee a Form W-2 in previous years. If
the firm issued a W-2 to this employee in years 2012 through 2015 as well,
I would then assign the relationship a tenure value of five. Second, in the
time series analysis, I use a slightly modified version of this definition.
Because earlier cohorts of sampled relationships cannot be traced back to
before 2000, when the earliest tax data is available, I define tenure as whether
a relationship existed in the year prior to when it was sampled. A worker in
a contractor relationship with a firm in 2003 is considered to have “tenure,”
in this case, if that same worker was also in a contractor relationship with
that firm in 2002.
5. Compensation Volatility
The IRS twenty-factor test does not explicitly include a factor directly
related to how much a worker’s compensation from a given firm varies from

130

See Harper, supra note 4, at 1298–99.
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 117, at 4 (“A continuing relationship between the worker
and the person for whom the services are performed for indicates employee status.”). In addition, the
updated twenty-factor test lists “Ongoing relationship” as a factor to which it gives “high priority.” Id.
132 See McFeeley v. Jackson St. Ent., LLC, 825 F.3d 235, 241 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Schultz v.
Cap. Int’l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 304–05 (4th Cir. 2006)).
133 Edward P. Lazear & Paul Oyer, Personnel Economics 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working
Paper No. 13480, 2007), https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w13480/w13480.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WG3W-3B7R].
134 Id.
131
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year to year. However, it does include the worker’s ability to realize profit
or loss, considered one of the three most important factors according to the
manual the IRS uses to train worker classification auditors.135 This factor is
related to the volatility in a worker’s compensation, including the possibility
that she will incur a loss, as described in greater detail below.
Like the income-dependence measure discussed above, compensation
volatility captures a form of dependence. Just as an employee is “dependent
upon” her employer if she draws most of her income from that firm, such
dependency may also rest on the stability of that compensation. This
volatility may be a function of many things, including a contractor’s
entrepreneurial activity and effort.136
Moreover, compensation volatility is crucial to economic welfare. In
most microeconomic models of behavior, people are assumed to have
“concave” utility functions, meaning that they experience diminishing
marginal returns from each additional dollar they receive.137 Therefore, a
worker’s utility is maximized if she receives the same compensation in equal
installments, rather than in unequal ones.
I define compensation volatility as the percentage change in a worker’s
compensation from a given payer-firm from the previous to the current tax
year. This measure is, by construction, only defined for workers who had a
relationship with a firm for at least two tax years. In the time-series analysis,
I take the absolute value of this change.
6. Amount and Nature of Deductions
Though there is not an exact analog that can be constructed and
contrasted for employees,138 the level and type of deductions for contractors
135 See IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR OR EMPLOYEE?: TRAINING
MATERIALS 2–21 (1996) (“The ability to realize a profit or incur a loss is probably the strongest evidence
that a worker controls the business aspects of services rendered.”).
136 A worker’s entrepreneurial activity and effort, in turn, is one of the factors identified by the IRS
twenty-factor test. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296.
137 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 79 (8th ed. 2008) (“The marginal utility of a
thing to anyone diminishes with every increase in the amount of it he already has.”); Richard Layard,
Guy Mayraz & Stephen Nickell, The Marginal Utility of Income, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 1846, 1851–57 (2008);
see also Kepa M. Ormazabal, The Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility in Alfred Marshall’s Principles
of Economics, 2 EUR. J. HIST. ECON. THOUGHT 91, 92 (1995) (discussing the logic underlying Marshall’s
treatment of utility function concavity). See generally Milton Friedman, The Permanent Income
Hypothesis, in A THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION 20 (1957), https://www.nber.org/system/
files/chapters/c4405/c4405.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6Y4-CJX8] (commonly cited for its proposition that
stochastic income shocks—i.e., compensation volatility—are harmful).
138 For the duration of my study window, employees were allowed to deduct unreimbursed expenses
incurred in the course of performing their duties. I.R.C. § 162. However, there were several restrictions
on these deductions that reduced business expense deductions by employees in practice. Most important,
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provide critical insight into how services are provided, and the financial
control exerted by the service purchaser. As discussed in Section II.A,
contractors are allowed considerable latitude in claiming business
deductions and are allowed to take them “above the line”—that is, even if
the taxpayer is not itemizing.139 This can have a significant effect on the
worker’s ultimate tax liability, and because expenses are not third-party
reported, can present serious tax-enforcement challenges.140
The existence and magnitude of deductions is also directly relevant to
four of the original twenty factors promulgated by the IRS.141 It is also, even
more so than compensation volatility, direct evidence of financial control as

these deductions—along with certain other costs, collectively called “miscellaneous itemized
deductions”—were only deductible if they exceeded a 2% floor of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.
I.R.C. §§ 62, 67(a). This creates a significant selection effect, where only employees who (1) itemize (this
tends to be those taxpayers with higher incomes and/or property holdings) and (2) have a very high
expense-to-income ratio can actually claim these deductions. Employees are unlikely to satisfy the second
condition because, in a competitive labor market, employers would need to compensate any
nonreimbursed expenses by increasing the employee’s wage, dollar for dollar, forgoing any bargaining
power from bulk or repeated purchases and forfeiting ownership claims on any capital assets.
Additionally, it is unlikely that most employees have the liquidity to purchase significant business inputs
up front.
Because of these restrictions on employee deductions, I opt not to compare contractors and employees
as I do with the previous measures, but instead do a single population analysis using the information
reported on the Schedule C. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 eliminated even this limited form of
business expense deduction for employees—starting in 2018, deductions for miscellaneous itemized
deductions were suspended. I.R.C § 67(g); see also Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11045,
131 Stat. 2054 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 67) (explaining that miscellaneous itemized
deductions would be prohibited until sunset of the provision).
139 I.R.C. §§ 62(a)(1), 162(a).
140 See, e.g., Slemrod et al., supra note 68, at 2–4 (showing that the introduction of third-party
reporting on gross income had limited effect on tax collections for self-employed taxpayers); see also
Adkihari et al., supra note 68, at 313–20 (showing that taxi drivers who are required to accept credit cards
and subject to third-party reporting on the 1099-K tend to offset the increase in reported gross income by
reporting a similar-sized increase in expenses).
141 These factors are:
13. Payment of business and/or traveling expenses. If the person for whom the services are
performed pays expenses, this indicates employee status. An employer, to control expenses,
generally retains the right to direct the worker.
14. Furnishing tools and materials: The provision of significant tools and materials to the worker
indicates employee status.
15. Significant investment: Investment in facilities used by the worker indicates independent
contractor status.
16. Realization of profit or loss: A worker who can realize a profit or suffer a loss as a result of
the services (in addition to profit or loss ordinarily realized by employees) is generally an
independent contractor.
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 117, at 4 (emphasis omitted).
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envisaged in IRS guidance: if deductions exceed revenues, the worker
suffers a loss.142
While I argue that certain values of total deductions are informative
(e.g., taking zero deductions), the absolute amount of deductions is likely to
vary significantly with the size of the business. Therefore, to compare the
deduction behavior of contractors with different levels of receipts, I divide
the total deductions claimed by gross receipts to produce an expense ratio
for contractors who filed Schedule Cs in that tax year.
In addition, the nature of the deductions may be informative of a
worker’s legal relationship to the payer-firm. While the existence of business
or travel expenses is one of the original twenty factors, additional guidance
from the IRS emphasizes the relevance of workers’ investment in equipment,
or other capital expenses captured by unreimbursed expenses; case law
similarly references worker’s investment as a factor in determining
classification.143
To gain traction on this concept, I identify line items that are most
closely associated with the actual rendering of the worker’s time (i.e., they
have no intrinsic value, unlike tools or equipment that can be resold) and
are likely exhaustible from the perspective of the payer-firm—that is, a
business dinner with the payer-firm’s clients likely benefits only that specific
client.144 I identify the following three line-item deductions as laborassociated expenses: car and truck (Line 9), travel (Line 24(a)), and meals
(Line 24(b)).145 I then divide the sum of these labor-associated deductions

142

According to Joint Committee on Taxation, courts tend to focus on the following factor,
particularly when the worker is highly educated or skilled: “16. Realization of profit or loss: A worker
who can realize a profit or suffer a loss as a result of the services (in addition to profit or loss ordinarily
realized by employees) is generally an independent contractor.” Id.
143 For example, the old IRS factor test included “Significant investment: An independent contractor
often has a significant investment in the equipment he or she uses in working for someone else.” Financial
Control, IRS (Apr. 6, 2022), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/financialcontrol [https://perma.cc/8MSE-WLAU]; see also Breaux & Daigle, Inc. v. United States, 900 F.2d 49,
53 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that crab pickers providing their own tools would usually weigh in favor of
finding independent contractor status, but ultimately finding that the pickers in question were employees
because “the value of the tools [was] so minimal” and other factors more strongly suggested employee
status); Ewens & Miller, Inc. v. Comm’r, 117 T.C. 263, 271 (2001) (“The fact that a worker provides his
or her own tools generally indicates independent contractor status.”). Similarly, the IRS cites
“[s]ignificant investment in the equipment that the worker uses” as a key question in determining financial
control. Financial Control, supra.
144 See generally Madhok, supra note 15, at 543–47 (discussing how firms’ decisions to produce inhouse or contract out depend in part on whether the resources required are exhaustible or retain value).
145 For an extended discussion of which deductions are associated with service provision, see
Matthew Knittel, Susan Nelson, Jason DeBacker, John Kitchen, James Pearce & Richard Prisinzano,
Methodology to Identify Small Businesses and Their Owners 4–6 (Off. of Tax Analysis, Dep’t of the
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by all deductions, yielding the labor deduction share. This construction
standardizes the importance of labor-associated deductions to each filer, i.e.,
it permits comparisons between contractors, who by virtue of industry or
geographic market, may have widely divergent dollar values of deductions
(i.e., different nominal deductions).
Of course, the tax data measures the deductions actually claimed by
contractors rather than those to which they are entitled, which may be the
more relevant factor in classification. Taxpayers may fail to deduct
legitimate expenses for a number of reasons—for example, lack of record
keeping and other compliance issues, and time constraints relative to the
filing deadline. However, actual behavior can still be informative, as I will
argue in the Section below.
B. Findings on the Nature of Work Relationships
Having established the intuition behind the chosen measures, in this
Section I detail three empirical findings. First, employee and contractor
relationships in 2016 were similar on several of these measures. Second,
differences between the two relationship types have narrowed over time.
And third, these similarities are most pronounced for low-income workers.
1. Employees and Contractors in 2016 Were Very Similar
For each quantitative measure presented here describing the nature of
individuals’ work and their relationships to firms, the goal is to determine
whether employees and contractors differ on that measure. However, merely
asking whether the average employee and the average contractor differ is
potentially misleading because several of these measures may contain
outliers. For example, if a handful of contractors have a very large number
of payers, then the average number of payers among contractors may be
significantly higher than the corresponding average among employees due
to this handful of outlier contractors. To guard against this, comparing the
characteristics of an employee and a contractor at a given percentile of their
respective distribution proves more informative. For example, when
considering the number of payers a worker has, one can compare the median
employee—half of employees have more payers than this employee, and half
of employees have fewer—with the median contractor. Though the median,
Treasury, Technical Paper No. 4, 2011). See also Thomas, supra note 80, at 1454–56 (explaining why
gig-economy workers are especially prone to underclaiming business deductions—among other reasons,
they are receiving self-employment income for the first time and may not be familiar with which expenses
are deductible or what type of documentation is required); Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, The Tax Lives
of Uber Drivers: Evidence from Internet Discussion Forums, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 56, 78–83 (2017)
(providing examples from internet discussion forums for Uber drivers that suggest widespread confusion
about what expenses are deductible).
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or the 50th percentile, is commonly used in such comparisons, one can
compare the employee and contractor at any percentile of their respective
distributions.
To compare employees and contractors on these quantitative measures
while remaining robust to outliers, I proceed in two ways. First, I examine
visual evidence comparing the distributions of these characteristics for
employees and contractors. Second, I rely on quantile regressions. Linear
regression is a technique used to determine the relationship of an
independent variable, such as education, to the average of a dependent
variable, such as earnings. A quantile regression is a similar technique to
determine the relationship between an independent variable and a specified
percentile of a dependent variable. For example, in the context of a causal
analysis, a quantile regression can estimate the effect of an education
intervention on low-earning workers, rather than on the average worker as a
linear regression would do. In this descriptive analysis, I use quantile
regression to estimate the relationship between a worker’s status and each of
the quantitative measures described earlier, measured at the 10th, 50th, and
90th percentiles. This allows me to determine whether employees and
contractors differ systematically at different points in the distributions of
each of these measures.
Before analyzing the six control proxies, I compare workers using
simple descriptive statistics of key variables (results are reported by tax year
in Table 2, supra Section II.B). These tabulations provide a check on the
underlying data quality and provide economic context to anchor the more
complex statistical comparisons which follow. Given its centrality to
analysis variable construction, I compare worker relationships on absolute
values of annual compensation in 2016 (Figure 2, supra Section II.B). For
employee relationships, this is the earnings reported on Form W-2; for
contractor relationships, this is the nonemployment compensation reported
on Form 1099-MISC/K. These distributions differ substantially from each
other at almost every percentile. The median compensation for a contractor
relationship is $3,300, compared to $13,500 for employees. At the 75th
percentile, this difference is even more pronounced: $10,900 for contractors,
but $39,200 for employees. While subsequent analyses will emphasize
distributional commonalities and changes over time, it is important to
acknowledge significant differences in the absolute values (“levels”) by
worker type. With that, I turn to comparing employees and contractors in
2016 across the six control proxy measures.
First, I examine the degree of income dependence exhibited by
employee and contractor relationships, defined as the proportion of a
worker’s total compensation of a particular type (contractor or employee
772
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compensation) that the worker earns from one of her payer-firms (Figure 3).
Unlike with the level of compensation, employees and contractors look very
similar in their degree of income dependence. Most workers depend on one
payer-firm for their entire income of a given type. This reliance on a single
relationship for all, or almost all, of their compensation is a common feature
of both employees and contractors. This pattern is confirmed in Table 3,
which reports the results of quantile regressions on income dependence at
the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles. In 2016, a worker’s dependence on the
sampled contractor relationship was just 1.4 percentage points less than that
of an employee at the 10th percentile, just 0.5 percentage points less at the
median, and exactly the same at the 90th percentile.
A related measure to income dependence is the worker’s number of
payers. In Figure 4, I compare the distributions of payers for employees and
contractors in 2016. The plurality of contractors and employees receive
compensation from only a single payer. This stands in stark contrast to the
perception that contractors perform services for multiple firms. Even beyond
this, the two distributions are very similar: The median number of payers for
contractors and employees is two, while the 75th percentile for both types of
workers is three. Where the two distributions differ substantially is in the
right tail: At the 95th percentile, for example, an employee has five payers,
while a contractor has ten.
TABLE 3: EQUIVALENCE OF EMPLOYEE AND CONTRACTOR
RELATIONSHIP DISTRIBUTIONS, 2016
Percentile
50th
(2)

Measure

10th
(1)

90th
(3)

Income Dependence
(Within Classification)

–0.014***
(0.000)

–0.005***
(0.002)

0.000
(0.000)

Distance (Miles)

0.000
(0.000)

1.586***
(0.043)

35.776***
(0.846)

Compensation Volatility

–0.018***
(0.002)

–0.023***
(0.000)

0.085***
(0.013)

Note. This table reports coefficients and standard errors from quantile regressions at the
specified percentiles for the indicated characteristics and a binary indicator for a contractor
relationship. Income dependence is defined as the sampled relationship’s compensation as
a share of all compensation from relationships of that type. Distance is defined as the
number of miles from the centroid of a firm’s zip code to the centroid of a worker’s zip
code. Compensation volatility is defined as the percent change in compensation from the
previous year, for relationships observed in the previous year.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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FIGURE 3: HISTOGRAM OF COMPENSATION AS A SHARE OF INCOME, BY CLASSIFICATION, 2016
Contractors

.5

Employees

Fraction of the Sample

.4

.3

.2

.1

0
0

.2

.4
.6
Compensation as a Share of Income

.8

Note. Figure 3 shows the distributions of the “compensation share of income,” defined as the amount of
compensation issued in the sampled relationship divided by the total compensation of that type (contractor,
employee) earned by the worker in the tax year. Despite the marked differences in the distribution of compensation,
workers display a strikingly similar degree of reliance on income from the sampled relationship. The majority of
workers of either type essentially rely on a single relationship for all of their compensation.
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FIGURE 4: HISTOGRAM OF NUMBER OF PAYERS, BY CLASSIFICATION, 2016
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Note. Figure 4 shows the distributions of the number of payers by worker classification for the tax year 2016. Several
points are worth noting. First, the plurality of workers, of either type, receive compensation from only a single payer.
This runs counter to the common perception of contractors performing services for multiple firms. Second, the
distributions are extremely similar for most workers: The median number of payers is the same for both types (two),
as is the 75th percentile (three). The contractor distribution begins to diverge from the employee distribution only for
the 90th percentile (four for employees, six for contractors), and differs drastically at the 95th percentile and above,
where a small group of contractors receive income from many firms without an analogous group of employees who
receive wages from many employers.

Figure 5 reports the distributions of distance, measured in miles,
between the payer and payee, for contractors and employees in 2016. Like
the distributions for number of payers, the distance distributions for
employees and contractors overlap significantly. This is confirmed in Table
3, which also reports the results of quantile regressions on the distance
measure. At the 10th percentile, there is no difference in distance between
employee and contractor relationships, and at the 50th percentile contractors
are just 1.6 miles farther away. However, as with the distributions for number
of payers, the distance distributions diverge at the right tail. At the 90th
percentile, contractors are located almost thirty-six miles farther from their
payer-firms than employees.
I compare the tenure of contractor and employee relationships in 2016
in Figure 6. Tenure is defined in this Figure as the number of consecutive
years in which a worker and a firm have had a relationship prior to 2016. It
is clear that employees and contractors diverge in the tails of their respective
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distributions: 46% of contractor relationships in 2016 are not observed in
prior years, relative to only 34% of employee relationships, while 17% of
employee relationships had tenures of ten or more years in 2016, compared
to only 8% of contractor relationships. While the tail behavior accords with
a common preconception that employees are more likely than contractors to
have “ongoing relationships,” it is the extreme right tail—not the median
relationships of each type—that drives this result.
FIGURE 5: HISTOGRAM OF DISTANCE BETWEEN WORKERS AND FIRMS,
BY CLASSIFICATION, 2016
.25
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Note. Figure 5 shows the distributions of the distance between a worker and a firm, defined as the “crow flies”
distance in miles between the centroid of a firm’s zip code and the centroid of a worker’s zip code. For readability,
only distances at or below the 90th percentile are plotted. The distributions mostly overlap, with the largest
differences appearing in the right tail excluded from the plot. For example, the 95th percentile distance for
contractors is 330 miles, while for employees it is 204 miles.
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FIGURE 6: HISTOGRAM OF RELATIONSHIP DURATION (TENURE), BY CLASSIFICATION, 2016
.5

Contractors

Employees

Fraction of the Sample

.4

.3

.2

.1

0
0

1

2

3

4
5
6
Number of Consecutive Tax Years

7

8

9

10

Note. Figure 6 shows the distributions of relationship tenure in 2016, defined as the number of years that a relationship
sampled in 2016 is consecutively observed prior to 2016. A value of zero means that the relationship was not observed
in tax year 2015. A value of ten means that the relationship was observed consecutively in ten or more years prior to
2016. As expected, employees have higher values of tenure on average than do contractors. This difference in the mass
is most pronounced at the tails: 46% of contractor relationships in 2016 are not observed in the prior year compared to
only 33.5% of employee relationships, whereas 16.9% of employee relationships had tenures of ten or more years in
2016 compared to 8.2% of contractor relationships.

The next measure I consider is compensation volatility (Figure 7),
which is limited to relationships that are also observed during the prior tax
year. The distributions for both employee and contractor relationships tend
to cluster near zero, where compensation is unchanged from one tax year to
the next. However, compared to the employee distribution, significantly
more of the contractor distribution is located to the left of zero, implying that
compensation in these relationships declined in 2016 relative to the year
prior. This difference between contractor and employee relationships is
likely due to several factors, including minimum-wage laws that set a floor
for employee compensation, as well as a phenomenon known as downward
wage rigidity in which employers seldom cut wages for employees.146 Figure
7 shows that although contractor relationships are more likely to see
146 See generally Joseph G. Altonji & Paul J. Devereux, The Extent and Consequences of Downward
Nominal Wage Rigidity (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7236, 1999),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w7236 [https://perma.cc/F5DB-ZS9E] (finding that employers rarely cut
employees’ wages).
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compensation fall, they are also more likely to see compensation rise from
one tax year to the next.
FIGURE 7: COMPENSATION VOLATILITY, BY CLASSIFICATION, 2016
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Note. Figure 7 shows the distributions of percent changes in compensation relative to the previous year. Percent
change is defined as the difference between the compensation in the sampled tax year and the compensation in the
prior tax year, divided by compensation in the prior year. This measure is inherently limited to relationships observed
in the prior tax year. For readability, percent changes below the 5th percentile or above the 95th percentile of the
contractor distribution are not plotted. A value of 1 means that compensation increased by 100%, or doubled, over
the previous tax year. Much of the mass in both distributions is clustered around zero, which implies no year over
year change in compensation. However, there are a few differences meriting attention. First, there is significantly
more mass to the left of zero for contractors than for employees, meaning that contractors are more likely to see
reductions in compensation from one year to the next than employees. Several factors may contribute to this,
including minimum wage laws that may prevent downward wage adjustments for full-time employees, and a welldocumented pattern of wage rigidity, particularly downward wage rigidity, for employees. Contractors may also be
more likely to work for varying amounts of the tax year, such as a full tax year followed by only a portion of a tax
year. Second, as with other metrics, there is a considerable right tail for contractors, suggesting that their
compensation volatility is symmetric (e.g., large increases year to year, in addition to large decreases). Finally, the
median percent change in compensation for contractors is zero, whereas the median for employees is 2.2%,
suggesting that wage growth for employees is modestly positive, unlike for contractors.

Table 3, supra, reports the results of quantile regressions on
compensation volatility. At the 10th and 50th percentiles, a contractor’s
compensation volatility is 1.8 percentage points and 2.3 percentage points
lower than that of an employee relationship, respectively. At the 90th
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percentile, however, a contractor’s compensation volatility is 8.5 percentage
points higher than that of an employee relationship. This underscores the
point that the compensation of contractors is more volatile, overall, than that
of employees.
The final measure I consider is deduction-taking among contractors
in 2016 (Figure 8). As discussed above in Section I.B, contractors are
generally indirectly reimbursed by payers for their expenses. Therefore, it is
particularly striking how many contractors do not claim any deductions. For
the sample in 2016, more than a third of contractors (35.6%) reported zero
deductions, and more than half of Schedule C filers (57.1%) claimed less
than $5,000 in total deductions. Similarly, only 9.1% of the sample of
contractors reported a loss.147 The types of deductions that contractors take
are also revealing. Labor-associated deductions make up the majority of
deductions under $5,000, suggesting that the division between contractor and
employee is more administrative than substantive. Contractors are largely
claiming small amounts of expenses that would have been reimbursed by
their employer had they been employees, rather than structurally different
capital investment expenses that could be used to provide services to other
clients.
Overall, in tax filings data from 2016, employee and contractor
relationships differed substantially on some measures, such as levels of
compensation, tenure, and compensation volatility, but were substantively
similar on others, such as income dependence, number of payers, and
distance to payer.

147 This number is difficult to interpret without its analog among employees. However, it raises the
question of what a profit/loss realization measure tells us. In addition to direct financial costs incurred
while performing work, an employee and a contractor both have an opportunity cost of their time and
effort. Opportunity costs are not observable, much less tax-deductible. Given that the vast majority of
contractors are claiming low-dollar-amount deductions, if any, it seems plausible that incurred
opportunity costs exceed any direct financial costs in value. This reasoning would suggest that the
economically meaningful measure (if not the legally meaningful one) of cost may be relatively similar
between contractors and employees, as employees cannot report a loss on wage income.
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FIGURE 8: HISTOGRAMS OF THE AMOUNT AND NATURE
OF CONTRACTOR SCHEDULE C DEDUCTIONS, 2016
Panel A: Total Deductions (Dollars) by Deduction Type

Panel B: Total Deductions (Dollars) by AGI
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Note. Figure 8 displays distributions of profit/loss and deductions in 2016. The sample for all Figures is limited to contractor
relationships where the payee could be matched to a Form 1040 Schedule C, or approximately 75% of all contractor
relationships (see Table 1). Panels A and B split the sample based on whether 50% or more of the payee’s deductions were for
“labor” expenses, defined as the sum of the three line-item deductions most strongly associated with service provision: car and
truck (Line 9), travel (Line 24(a)), and meals (Line 24(b)).148 Panel A shows that contractors with mostly labor deductions are
disproportionately likely to deduct less than $500. Panel B shows that low-income households are significantly less likely to
claim any deductions at all.

2. Work Relationships Have Converged
Instead of comparing employee and contractor relationships at a single
point in time (tax year 2016), I now turn to comparing the dynamics of these
relationships over time, using a similar set of measures. First, I consider
changes in the degree of income dependence among employee and contractor
relationships (Figure 9A). In 2001, the average sampled contractor
relationship represented just over 65% of a worker’s total contractor income,
and the average sampled employee relationship represented just over 70% of
a worker’s total employee income. By 2016 that gap had narrowed modestly,
mostly due to an increase in the dependence of contractors on a single
contractor relationship.
Second, I examine the evolution in the number of payers of contractors
and employees (Figure 10A). As expected, contractors have, throughout this
period, had on average a larger number of payers than employees,
particularly due to the long right tail of this distribution. However, while in

148 See, for example, Knittel et al., supra note 145, for an extended discussion of which deductions
are associated with service provision.
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2001 contractors had, on average, just over one additional payer relative to
employees, by 2016 this gap was cut almost in half.
FIGURE 9A: INCOME DEPENDENCE: SHARE OF TOTAL LABOR INCOME REPRESENTED BY
SAMPLED RELATIONSHIP, 2001–2016, BY WORKER CLASSIFICATION
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Note. Figure 9A, and Figure 9B in the next Section, plot the average share of a worker’s total labor income, by classification,
represented by the sampled relationship. For example, in 2001, the average firm–contractor relationship captured on a Form
1099-MISC or 1099-K represented approximately 65% of a worker’s total contractor income, defined as the sum of
compensation reported on the Forms 1099-MISC or 1099-K issued to that worker in 2001.
As expected, a given contractor relationship constitutes a smaller share of a worker’s total contractor income, compared
to a given employment relationship as a share of a worker’s total employee income. However, this gap has narrowed
considerably from 2001 to 2016, as the dependence of contractors on a single contractor relationship has grown. Fluctuations
in employees’ dependence on a single employment relationship corresponds to business cycle activity—rising during
recessions and declining during expansions. The Forms W-2 sampled during a recession are more likely to be the only
employment relationship of those workers during the sampled year, for example.
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FIGURE 10A: NUMBER OF PAYERS: AVERAGE NUMBER OF UNIQUE PAYERS, 2001–2016,
BY WORKER CLASSIFICATION
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Note. Figure 10A, and Figure 10B in the next Section, show the average number of firms or “payers” with which workers
contract, by classification. A worker’s number of payers is calculated as the number of unique firms issuing Forms W-2
(for employees) or Forms 1099-MISC or 1099-K (for contractors) to the worker in a given tax year. The number of distinct
payers from which contractors receive compensation has declined steadily over the study window, from 3.5 to 2.5 payers.
The number of payers per worker with an employment relationship has declined slightly over the same period.
The levels themselves are worth noting. Even in 2001, the average number of payers a sampled contractor had was
relatively small—fewer than four—while the average employee at that time had two employers. Recognizing that the
distribution of number of payers for contractors has a long right tail, if we focus on those below the 95th percentile, the
resulting average number of payers looks much more similar to employees.

Third, I explore how the distance between payer and payee for
contractors and employees has changed (Figure 11A). As with the number
of payers, the median for contractors is consistently higher than the median
for employees, with the magnitude of this difference being driven by the long
right tail of the contractors’ distribution. Unlike the preceding series, the gap
between contractors and employees does not narrow, but actually widens
with time. This may be partially explained by the introduction of Form 1099K in 2011. This form, which captures contractor income made through credit
card transactions, is typically issued by credit card companies or other
market makers, often with a corporate address rather than one associated
with where the work takes place.
Fourth, I consider the evolution of relationship tenure (i.e., relationship
duration) for contractors and employees (Figure 12A). Unlike the tenure
measure described in Section III.B.1, this definition of tenure measures
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whether the relationship existed in the prior tax year and is therefore reported
only from 2002 onward. Employee relationships are more likely to have
existed in the prior year than contractor relationships. However, the gap
between these two rates has diminished substantially from 2002 to 2016,
implying that contractor relationships have grown more stable over time.
FIGURE 11A: DISTANCE: MEDIAN DISTANCE BETWEEN PAYER AND PAYEE, 2001–2016,
BY WORKER CLASSIFICATION
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Note. Figure 11A, and Figure 11B in the next Section, show the mean distance between firms and workers, using information
contained on the information report (i.e., Forms W-2, 1099-MISC, 1099-K). The distance variable is the “as the crow flies”
length in miles between the centroid of a worker’s zip code and the centroid of a firm’s zip code. An important caveat is that
the address associated with the payer is not always the same as the address associated with the work location. While stability
in the IRS data is quite high, the address of the payer is at the EIN level, which is not the same as the plant- or establishmentlevel address. This may explain the increase beginning after year 2011, when Form 1099-K was introduced as an additional
source of information on contractor income. Form 1099-Ks are typically issued by market makers (i.e., Uber) or credit card
companies. It is unlikely that the corporate headquarters of the market maker is close to the recipient’s home address.
Despite this limitation, it is striking how the employee and contractor series move together until just after 2011. In
general, it has been well-documented that the effective size of the labor market is expanding, as commuting times increase and
work-from-home arrangements have become more common among both employees and contractors.
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FIGURE 12A: TENURE: SHARE OF WORKERS CONTINUING A RELATIONSHIP
FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR, 2002–2016, BY WORKER CLASSIFICATION
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Note. Figure 12A, and Figure 12B in the next Section, show a simplified tenure metric: the share of relationships that
existed in the year prior to the year in which the relationship was sampled. For example, among contractor relationships
sampled in 2002, approximately 45% also existed in 2001. Under this definition, the tenure of employment relationships
is generally higher than the tenure of contractor relationships, as we would expect. However, this gap has gradually
narrowed over the analysis period. In 2016, 63.2% of employment relationships existed in the prior tax year, down from
a peak of 70% in 2009.

Fifth, I study changes in workers’ compensation volatility for
contractors and employees (Figure 13A). Note that here, I consider absolute
changes in compensation from one tax year to the next, treating increases
and decreases in the same way. In 2002, the average sampled contractor
relationship had compensation that differed by 35% from the year prior,
compared to just under 20% for the average sampled employee relationship.
This gap of over 15 percentage points narrowed to almost 10 percentage
points by 2016, as both employee compensation volatility increased and
contractor compensation volatility decreased.
Finally, I examine changes in contractors’ deduction-taking (Figures
14A, 14B). Contractors exhibit a trend of decreasing deductions as a share
of gross receipts, which is shown separately by workers’ adjusted gross
income (AGI). The sharp drop in 2007 might be explained, in part, by a
reluctance of contractors to make investments (and incur outlay costs) in the
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uncertain conditions surrounding the financial crisis.149 Whatever the cause
for this drop, if we assume that most employees have a deduction to grossreceipts ratio near zero,150 then contractors have observably converged
toward employees over the sample period. There has also been a steady rise
in the fraction of deductions for labor-associated expenses, again indicating
that contractors and employees are becoming more alike in economic
substance. This is because employees are often reimbursed for laborassociated expenses. For example, if two workers incur the same expense in
the course of performing tasks, such as taking a client out to dinner or
purchasing gas for delivery, and one worker is reimbursed for these expenses
by her employer while the other includes this cost in her gross compensation
and then deducts it, this is a distinction without an economic difference.
FIGURE 13A: COMPENSATION VOLATILITY: MAGNITUDE OF PERCENT CHANGE FROM THE
PREVIOUS YEAR, 2002–2016, BY WORKER CLASSIFICATION
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Note. Figure 13A plots the magnitude of the percent change in a worker’s compensation relative to the previous year, for
those workers who had a relationship with the same firm in the previous year. For example, on average, the compensation
received in a contractor relationship in 2002 was 35% different (higher or lower) than the compensation received in that same
contractor relationship in 2001. The volatility of contractor compensation is uniformly higher, on average, than the volatility
of employee compensation. However, this gap has narrowed considerably over time as contractor–compensation volatility
has declined and employee–compensation volatility has increased.
149 See Michael D. Hurd & Susann Rohwedder, Effects of the Financial Crisis and Great Recession
on American Households 13–15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 16407, 2010),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w16407/w16407.pdf [https://perma.cc/H4JL-F5BE]
(finding that after the crash, people tended to decrease their stock holdings in retirement accounts).
150 See supra note 146 for further discussion of the reasonability of this assumption.
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FIGURE 14: DEDUCTIONS: CHANGE IN THE MAGNITUDE AND NATURE OF SCHEDULE C
DEDUCTIONS, 2001–2016
Panel A: Ratio of Deductions to Receipts
.7

.6

Share of
Deductions
.5
over Gross Receipts

Contractor
(High AGI)

.4

Contractor
(Low AGI)

.3
2001

2003

2005

2007

2009
2011
Tax Year

2013

2015

Panel B: Median Share of Labor Deductions
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Note. Figure 14 shows the ratio of deductions to receipts (Panel A) and the share of total deductions that are for “labor” or
service associated expenses (see Notes to Figure 8A, supra Section III.B.1). Contractor relationships are limited to those
that could be matched to a Schedule C (see Table 1, supra Section II.A). In Panel A, which plots the median ratio of
deductions to receipts, high-AGI contractors claim a higher amount of deductions throughout the series, but all contractors
have seen a secular decline in deductions and a corresponding increase in profit share. This may be a selection effect related
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to the influx of contractors into the economy between 2008 and 2015 (see Figure 1, supra Section II.B).
Panel B plots the median share of “labor deductions” over the same time frame. While low-AGI contractors always
have a higher share of labor expenses, and both types of contractors exhibit a secular increase in the labor share of
deductions, this share has also grown faster for low-AGI contractors.

3. Convergence Most Pronounced for Lower Income Workers
The patterns I have documented so far have considered all sampled
employee and contractor relationships equally. However, this approach
masks important differences in how the two types of workers compare—and
how comparisons between them have evolved over time—based on a
worker’s place within the income distribution. Specifically, these
phenomena have not been shared or experienced equally by low-income and
high-income workers, which I can measure by linking workers to their Forms
1040 to recover their AGI. Categorizing workers as low-income if their AGI
is below the median in a given tax year and as high-income otherwise, I
reexamine the evidence presented in the previous two Sections.
First, the gap between employees and contractors in their income
dependence on a single relationship appears to be driven almost entirely by
high-income workers. Among low-income workers, the degree of income
dependence exhibited by employees and contractors is, and has been for
many years, quite similar (Figure 9B). This suggests that low-income
workers are equally dependent upon a given relationship, whether employee
or contractor.
Second, the gap between employees and contractors in their number of
payers is also driven almost entirely by high-income workers. Throughout
the period studied here, among low-income workers, the average number of
payers for employees and contractors has been almost identical (Figure 10B).
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FIGURE 9B: INCOME DEPENDENCE: SHARE OF TOTAL LABOR INCOME REPRESENTED BY
SAMPLED RELATIONSHIP, 2001–2016, BY WORKER CLASSIFICATION AND AGI
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Note. Figure 9B plots the same measure as Figure 9A in the last Section, but disaggregated by whether the worker’s AGI was
above or below the median during that tax year (calculated over the universe of filers). Figure 9B is limited to contractor
relationships that could be linked to 1040 returns (see Table 1, supra Section II.A). Interestingly, while high-AGI workers
are distinguishable on this metric, low-AGI workers trend similarly. The convergence between employees and contractors
observed in Panel A seems to be driven not only by an upward trend in income dependence among low-AGI contractors, but
also a downward trend among low-AGI employees.
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FIGURE 10B: NUMBER OF PAYERS: AVERAGE NUMBER OF UNIQUE PAYERS, 2001–2016,
BY WORKER CLASSIFICATION AND AGI
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Note. Figure 10B plots the same measure as Figure 10A in the last Section, but breaks out this trend by a worker’s AGI,
again limited to relationships where the payee could be matched to a Form 1040. As with income dependence, low-AGI
contractors and employees trend similarly. While high-AGI employees have the fewest payers, the convergence seems to
be primarily driven by the reduction in the number of payers among high-AGI contractors.

Third, when comparing employee and contractor relationships in the
distance between payers and payees, the large gap narrows somewhat for
low-income workers and widens for high-income workers (Figure 11B).
Both high- and low-income contractors experience the same uptick in
distance in the years following the introduction of Form 1099-K.
Fourth, high-income workers’ employee relationships have, by far, the
highest likelihood of continuing from one year to the next, and low-income
workers’ contractor relationships have the lowest likelihood (Figure 12B).
Interestingly, there is much less dispersion among contractor relationships in
this measure of tenure, regardless of a worker’s level of income; both highand low-income contractors have relatively low rates of tenure. By contrast,
low-income workers’ employee relationships are much less stable than those
of high-income workers, more closely resembling contractor relationships.

789

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
FIGURE 11B: DISTANCE: MEDIAN DISTANCE BETWEEN PAYER AND PAYEE, 2001–2016,
BY WORKER CLASSIFICATION AND AGI
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Note. Figure 11B plots the same measure as Figure 11A in the last Section. It shows that the trend in Figure 11A affects lowand high-AGI workers in largely the same way, although, again, it is low-AGI employees and low-AGI contractors that are closer
than their high-AGI counterparts.
FIGURE 12B: TENURE: SHARE OF WORKERS CONTINUING A RELATIONSHIP
FROM THE PREVIOUS YEAR, 2002–2016, BY WORKER CLASSIFICATION AND AGI
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Note. Figure 12B plots the same measure as Figure 12A in the last Section. It shows the significant difference in the likelihood
of continuing a relationship for high-AGI employees and all other workers. While low-AGI contractors are the least likely,
high-AGI contractors are more likely to continue a relationship into a second year than low-AGI employees.
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Fifth, and as with tenure, high-income workers’ compensation volatility
in employee relationships is very low compared to all other workers and
relationship types (Figure 13B). Contractor relationships, regardless of a
worker’s income level, demonstrate high compensation volatility. Lowincome workers’ employee relationships once again appear very similar to
those of contractor relationships.
Finally, the deduction-taking behavior I measure for low-income
workers in contractor relationships suggests an even greater similarity in the
nature of their work to that of employees (assuming a deduction to grossreceipts ratio is close to zero for employees as stated above).151 The deduction
share of gross receipts is closer to zero for low-income workers, and the
labor-associated share of total deductions is higher.
FIGURE 13B: COMPENSATION VOLATILITY: MAGNITUDE OF PERCENT CHANGE FROM THE
PREVIOUS YEAR, 2002–2016, BY WORKER CLASSIFICATION AND AGI
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Note. Figure 13B plots the same measure as Figure 13A in the last Section. It tells a similar story to Figure 12B. High-AGI
employees have the lowest volatility in year-over-year compensation, while all other workers have considerably higher
volatility. While volatility for both high- and low-AGI contractors has decreased, the compensation of low-AGI employee
relationships has become more volatile, perhaps reflecting wage increases that were delayed in the immediate aftermath of
the recession.

151

See supra note 146.
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IV. INTERPRETING CONVERGENCE IN PROXY MEASURES OF CONTROL
The results presented in Section III.B demonstrate that employees and
contractors have grown more similar over time on several proxy measures of
the worker–firm relationship related to financial and behavioral control.
What can explain this pattern of convergence in the control proxies? I
consider four hypotheses: (1) an increase in legal uncertainty about which
workers are contractors; (2) a change in firms’ propensity to intentionally
misclassify employees as contractors or vice versa; (3) a change in how
predictive the control proxy is of actual control; and (4) a structural shift in
the labor market away from supervised work. These hypotheses are not
mutually exclusive.
This Part proposes a framework for understanding more clearly how
each of these hypotheses could give rise to the observed convergence in the
control proxies. The object of providing this framework is not to promote
one hypothesis as more important or more likely than the others. Rather, it is
to formalize the relationship between four elements: the concept of
“control,” the law that creates a binary classification based on control,
workers’ reported classifications, and the “control proxy” measures used to
estimate actual control. Both law and reality are messy—this formalism,
while reductive, permits a more structured discussion of the findings.
A. Framework for Interpreting Observed Convergence
Before we begin, it is helpful to precisely define the framework’s key
elements:
Control (𝒄𝒊 ): As discussed earlier, control is a multifaceted and
complex concept. In this framework, control exists along a continuum and is
denoted by the variable 𝑐. The degree of control exercised by a firm over the
work of worker 𝑖 is denoted by 𝑐𝑖 .152 For example, if a worker uses her own
tools to complete a project for a firm and will be paid upon its completion,
then the firm exercises relatively little control over that worker,
corresponding to a low value of 𝑐𝑖 . Alternatively, if a worker performs
routine tasks at a firm’s office using a firm computer and is paid hourly, then
the firm exercises a lot of control over that worker, corresponding to a high

152 I make two simplifications here. First, we treat 𝑐 as a single continuous (scalar) variable, though
𝑖
in reality control is a multidimensional concept and 𝑐𝑖 is most accurately thought of as a vector, a variable
which varies along multiple dimensions. For example, height is a scalar variable, measured along a single
dimension (inches); in contrast “attractiveness” likely has several components (e.g., height, earnings,
weight, clothing choice, etc.), which a researcher would represent in a matrix or vector variable. Second,
I assume that worker 𝑖 is engaged in a relationship with a single firm, so I do not consider her value of 𝑐𝑖
across firms.
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value of 𝑐𝑖 . The firm knows the value of 𝑐𝑖 for each of its workers.153
However, determining the value of 𝑐𝑖 for any given firm–worker relationship
for an outsider, whether the IRS or a researcher, is difficult and costly.
Determining 𝑐𝑖 involves gathering many different inputs, some of which
must be directly observed by an auditor at the work site.
The Law (𝒄∗ ): While a worker’s 𝑐𝑖 is continuous,154 how she is
classified under the law is binary: A given firm–worker relationship is either
that of an employee or that of an independent contractor—the relationship
cannot be classified as both for purposes of the same application.155 In this
framework, we represent the law’s imposition of this dichotomy by a
threshold value of 𝑐, denoted by 𝑐 ∗ . The true classification of a worker’s
relationship is fully determined by her value of 𝑐𝑖 relative to 𝑐 ∗ . If 𝑐𝑖 < 𝑐 ∗ ,
the worker is appropriately classified under law as a contractor. If 𝑐𝑖 > 𝑐 ∗ ,
the worker is appropriately classified as an employee.
Put another way, 𝑐𝑖 determines whether a worker in a relationship with
a firm should be classified as an employee or a contractor: her “real”
classification under the law, or how the IRS would classify her if it conducted
an audit to reveal all of the particularities of her relationship relevant to the
common law standard. While we assume that the firm knows the value of 𝑐𝑖
for each of its workers, the firm may be in the dark about the value of 𝑐 ∗ . For
example, the firm may have two workers who perform services. The firm
knows that it exercises more supervision over worker 1 compared to worker
2 (𝑐1 > 𝑐2 ). However, the firm may not know whether the amount of control
exercised translates into worker 1 being properly classified as a contractor—
that is, whether 𝑐1 < 𝑐 ∗. But if worker 1 should be classified as a contractor,
then it follows that worker 2 must be one as well, because 𝑐2 < 𝑐1 < 𝑐 ∗.
Reported Classification: In contrast with a worker’s “true”
classification under the law, a worker’s “reported” classification is how the
firm represents their relationship to the IRS. The firm may report the
relationship as being either type, regardless of the value of 𝑐𝑖 , though the
closer 𝑐𝑖 is to 𝑐 ∗ , the less likely the firm is to have their classification audited.
Misclassification occurs when there is a discrepancy between the true
classification (based on the value of 𝑐𝑖 in relation to 𝑐 ∗ ) and the reported
153 The firm “knows” the value of 𝑐 in the sense that the firm dictates the level of supervision and
𝑖
constraints for a given position or task.
154 By “continuous,” I mean that 𝑐 can take on infinitely many values, reflecting the real and
𝑖
significant diversity of working relationships that exist in reality.
155 That is not to say that a given worker cannot be classified as a contractor for the purposes of one
regulatory system and as an employee for another. As was discussed in Part II, the definitions used by
different agencies overlap, but not perfectly. For example, the IRS has a special designation, “statutory
employee,” which refers to a worker who is classified for tax purposes as an employee but does not meet
the common law definition of an employee. See Statutory Employees, supra note 1.
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classification. Misclassification may be deliberate on the part of the firm, or
the firm and the worker, but, in some cases, misclassification is likely
inadvertent, and any benefit incidental. First, a firm may intentionally
misclassify a worker to avoid regulatory costs that are only incurred for
workers of a certain classification. An example is the ACA employer
mandate, which required all firms of a certain size to provide health
insurance to their employees, but not to their contractors.156 To the extent that
the firm is unable to pass through the full cost of providing health insurance
to employees, it might choose to report a worker whose true classification is
employee (𝑐𝑖 > 𝑐 ∗ ) as a contractor to avoid that cost. Though most
regulatory costs adhere to the employee classification, there are exceptions.
For example, firms have a much stronger claim to certain intellectual
property rights associated with work product created by an employee as
compared to a contractor.157
Second, a firm may unintentionally misclassify a worker if the firm
does not know the value of 𝑐 ∗ and therefore cannot determine the position of
𝑐𝑖 in relation to it. Generally, this type of mistake of law is more likely to
occur for workers with 𝑐𝑖 close to 𝑐 ∗ , or when there is substantial legal
uncertainty created by seemingly contradictory applications of the standard
(e.g., in the federal context, a circuit split), or if there are many relationships
that could be appropriately classified either way.158
Control Proxy (𝒙𝒊 ): As mentioned above, measuring 𝑐𝑖 for any
particular worker–firm relationship is fact-intensive and likely to be
prohibitively costly at scale. In contrast, let 𝑥𝑖 be a continuous proxy measure
of control that can be readily observed by researchers and the IRS in
administrative tax data, such as the distance between a firm’s headquarters

156 The ACA employer mandate requires “an employer who employed an average of at least 50 fulltime employees on business days during the preceding calendar year” to provide health insurance to their
employees. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H.
157 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., CIRCULAR 9: WORKS MADE FOR HIRE 1–2 (2012),
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL2S-ZEEV].
158 There is another conceivable source of unintentional misclassification—that which results from
measurement error in 𝑐𝑖 , or a mistake of fact. In this circumstance, there is daylight between the actual
value of 𝑐𝑖 and the firm’s estimate of 𝑐𝑖 . This might happen if there is a communication failure between
a worker’s direct supervisor and the person or department responsible for making the classification
decision. For instance, firms may have centralized HR departments that are located at corporate
headquarters, rather than on-site where the work is performed; in such a situation, if the direct supervisor
neglects to relay to HR that the worker provided her own tools, HR may infer a different value of 𝑐𝑖 than
they would if in possession of all relevant facts. In practice, discovery of these mistakes of fact are
comparatively rare, both because HR departments specialize in making this determination and will solicit
all relevant facts, and because this error would only be discovered by the IRS if its auditors directly
observed behavior inaccessible to the decision-maker (e.g., a multiday site visit and/or extended interview
with the worker herself).
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and the worker’s address considered in Section III.A.159 We assume that 𝑥𝑖
and 𝑐𝑖 are positively correlated, but the correlation is imperfect: A worker
with a higher value of 𝑥𝑖 is also more likely to have a higher value of 𝑐𝑖 and
thus is more likely to have a true classification of employee, but her true
classification is based on 𝑐𝑖 and 𝑐 ∗ , and not on 𝑥𝑖 .
While we cannot directly observe how a worker should be classified
based on 𝑐𝑖 , we can directly observe how a worker is classified in the tax
data, which allows us to measure how the distribution of 𝑥𝑖 varies for
workers by their reported classification. For example, if 𝑥𝑖 is distance from
the employer’s address, it stands to reason that true employees, who are more
likely (pre-pandemic) to be required to work on-site, will have lower values
of 𝑥𝑖 on average than do true contractors. Yet there are bound to be
exceptions: Some true employees have flexible work arrangements that
allow them to live farther from their employer (high 𝑥𝑖 ), while some true
contractors may only service customers within a short distance of their home
(low 𝑥𝑖 ). Though 𝑥𝑖 is not determinative of 𝑐𝑖 , it can be predictive, and this
could give rise to aggregate patterns in the distribution of 𝑥𝑖 that differ based
on reported classification.
*

*

*

For a visual representation of how these concepts relate to one another,
consider Figure 15 which features generated data. Panel A presents a
hypothetical distribution of 𝑐𝑖 in the population of workers. This distribution
is characterized by two features: a clear definition of 𝑐 ∗ , and a bimodal
distribution of 𝑐𝑖 featuring one larger group of workers with 𝑐𝑖 > 𝑐 ∗ (true
employees) and another smaller group of workers with 𝑐𝑖 < 𝑐 ∗ (true
contractors). There are almost no workers located near the 𝑐 ∗ threshold; from
a classification perspective, this is an idealized setting, as there are few
workers with 𝑐𝑖 close to 𝑐 ∗ whose true classification might be ambiguous to
a firm.
Panel B presents hypothetical distributions of a control proxy measure,
𝑥𝑖 , separately by workers’ reported classification. In this example, we
assume that there is no misclassification, intentional or otherwise: Each
worker is correctly classified by her firm as an employee (if 𝑐𝑖 > 𝑐 ∗ ) or a
contractor (if 𝑐𝑖 < 𝑐 ∗ ). Nevertheless, because 𝑥𝑖 is a proxy that is only
imperfectly correlated with 𝑐𝑖 , we see that the distribution of 𝑥𝑖 , while also
bimodal, features more overlap than the distribution of 𝑐𝑖 , as indicated by the
shaded area. Using the example above where 𝑥𝑖 represents proximity to an
employer’s address, the workers in the overlap may be employees with a low
159 Although 𝑥 may be most accurately thought of as a vector because there may be multiple proxy
𝑖
measures for control, I treat it as a scalar variable here to maintain consistency with 𝑐𝑖 .
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value of 𝑥𝑖 who live farther from their employer and the contractors with a
high value of 𝑥𝑖 who only service customers close to where they live.
Finally, Panel C provides a visual representation of the relationship
between 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑐𝑖 , with each worker represented as a point on the graph and
distinguished by their reported classification. The shaded area represents the
range of values of 𝑥𝑖 in which there is overlap in workers’ reported
classification, analogous to the shaded area in Panel B.
I treat the data displayed in Figure 15 as a baseline. In the next Section,
I consider how each of the four hypotheses introduced above would apply to
this framework, and how each would be represented in this data. The
observed pattern of convergence in the control proxies refers to the degree
of overlap in the distributions of 𝑥𝑖 by workers’ reported classification, or
the size of the shaded areas in Panels B and C of Figure 15. The greater the
degree of convergence, the more workers whose reported classification differ
have similar values of 𝑥𝑖 on average.
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FIGURE 15: BASELINE DISTRIBUTIONS OF, AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN,
CONTROL (c) AND THE CONTROL PROXY (x)
Panel A: Distribution of Control (-c)

c < c*
Contractors

c*

c > c*
Employees

Panel B: Distributions of Control Proxy (x)

Contractor (Reported)

Employee (Reported)

Panel C: Relationship Between Control and Its Proxy

Contractor (Reported)
Employee (Reported)
c < c*
Contractors

c*

c > c*
Employees

Note. Figure 15 plots distributions of generated data designed to highlight the relationship
between components of the framework described above. Panel A shows the distribution of 𝑐𝑖 ,

797

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
a measure of the true control exercised by a firm in its relationship with a worker. Panel B
shows distributions of 𝑥𝑖 , a proxy measure of true control, separately by workers’ reported
classification. Panel C shows the relationship between 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑐𝑖 , separately by workers’
reported classification. The shaded regions in Panels B and C denote ranges of 𝑥𝑖 in which
there is overlap between workers of each reported classification.

B. Four Hypotheses that May Explain the Results
In what follows, I offer four non-mutually-exclusive hypotheses for
why the measured convergence in observed proxy measures for control may
be occurring. Each of the hypotheses is represented as a set of three panels
in Figure 16.
1. An Increase in Legal Uncertainty
The first convergence hypothesis is that the legal distinction between
employees and contractors, represented in my framework and in the baseline
scenario as a sharp threshold, 𝑐 ∗ , became much less sharp due to changes in
the common law definition of a contractor (Figure 16, Panel A.1). Instead of
a single sharp threshold determining whether a worker should be classified
as an employee or contractor, there are now a range of control values,
[𝑐 − , 𝑐 + ], describing firm–worker relationships that could plausibly be
classified either as employees or contractors. As a result, a worker who had
previously been unambiguously an employee (𝑐𝑖 ∈ [𝑐 ∗ , 𝑐 + ]) might now be
appropriately classified as a contractor, and a worker who had previously
been unambiguously a contractor (𝑐𝑖 ∈ [𝑐 − , 𝑐 ∗ ]) might now be appropriately
classified as an employee. A direct result of this increased legal uncertainty
is greater overlap in the distributions of 𝑥𝑖 by workers’ reported
classifications (Figure 16, Panels B.1 and C.1), with the degree of
convergence growing with the “fuzziness” of the boundary separating these
two worker classes (e.g., the width of [𝑐 − , 𝑐 + ]).
2. An Increase in Intentional Misclassification
The second convergence hypothesis is that firms intentionally
misclassify workers in ways that are financially advantageous, typically by
classifying would-be employees as contractors to avoid complying with
costly regulations. Under this hypothesis, the threshold distinguishing
employees from contractors remains clear (𝑐 ∗ ) and the distribution of 𝑐𝑖
remains unchanged (Figure 16, Panel A.2), but firms take advantage of
limited enforcement resources—and the significant cost inherent to the IRS
in determining the true value of 𝑐𝑖 in any given case—to misclassify workers,
particularly near the threshold. As with the previous hypothesis, this would
cause the distributions of 𝑥𝑖 for workers reported to be employees and
contractors to converge (Figure 16, Panels B.2 and C.2).
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Misclassification risks penalty if discovered.160 However, if firms are
risk neutral, many more may decide that the gamble is worthwhile as
additional regulatory costs were attached to employee classification.
3. Change in Correlation Between Actual and Observed Control
The third convergence hypothesis is that the relationship between the
actual level of control characterizing a firm–worker relationship (𝑐𝑖 ) and the
proxy measure we have available for it (𝑥𝑖 ) is changing over time. Similar to
the previous hypothesis, the underlying nature of work and the threshold for
determining a worker’s true classification remain unchanged (Figure 16,
Panel A.3), but there is greater overlap in the proxy measure distributions by
workers’ reported classifications (Figure 16, Panels B.3 and C.3).
4. Change in the Underlying Distribution of Control
All of the preceding hypotheses show that the distribution of the true
degree of control, 𝑐𝑖 , remains unchanged, and the convergence is caused
either by reclassification (hypotheses 1 and 2) or measurement error
(hypothesis 3). In contrast, the final convergence hypothesis is that the
distribution of 𝑐𝑖 itself has changed. For example, if the distribution of 𝑐𝑖
became less clearly bimodal and began to feature significant overlap around
the threshold (Figure 16, Panel A.4), then the convergence we observe in 𝑥𝑖
results from convergence in 𝑐𝑖 itself (Figure 16, Panels B.4 and C.4).

160

As one article puts it:

If the IRS determines that an individual has been misclassified, it may levy penalties against the
employer, including, but not limited to, a $50 fine for each Form W-2 the employer failed to file
on such employee, a penalty of up to 3% of the wages, plus up to 40% of the FICA taxes that
were not withheld from the employee and up to 100% of the matching FICA taxes the employer
should have paid. If the IRS determines that an employer misclassified its employees willfully,
the penalties are even greater.
Cayman Caven, 2021 Update – IRS Misclassifications and Costly Penalties: Independent Contractor or
Employee, JDSUPRA (June 16, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/2021-update-irsmisclassifications-and-8009270/ [https://perma.cc/KVA7-A3Q3]; see also 42 C.F.R. § 422.510 (granting
permission for the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services to terminate an organization's Medicare
Advantage contract if that organization provides false information); 26 U.S.C. § 7202 (providing for a
fine of up to $10,000 for willfully misclassifying an employee for tax purposes).
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Each of these four hypotheses could give rise to the observed
convergence in the control proxies described in Section III.B. Although the
framework does not promote any hypothesis over the others, the results
discussed in Part V suggest that intentional misclassification (hypothesis 2)
is likely responsible for a meaningful part of the observed convergence. One
potential reason for this is that the code is rife with discontinuous tax
treatments that render misclassification financially advantageous to the
worker, the firm, or both.161
V. CAUSAL ANALYSIS: AN EXAMPLE OF
COST-MOTIVATED SUBSTITUTION
This Part describes the motivation behind, and the results from, a causal
analysis of firm behavior in response to an increase in the cost of an
employee relative to a contractor. Using a feature of the Medicare eligibility
rules that affects small and large firms differently when an employee turns
sixty-five, I demonstrate that firms’ decisions about how to classify a worker
are not motivated solely by the criteria featured in multifactor balancing tests
but also by financial incentives.
A. Firm Size and Medicare Eligibility Rules
Medicare is a national health insurance program intended primarily for
older individuals.162 Americans aged sixty-five and older are automatically
eligible for Medicare regardless of where they live, whether they are
employed, or whether they are covered by any existing form of health
insurance.163 Prior to becoming eligible for Medicare, many people obtain
health insurance coverage through their employer as part of a group health
plan offered to employees.164 When someone is employed and receiving

161 See, e.g., Nunnallee, supra note 55, at 109–11 (describing Section 530 as a “powerful safe harbor”
that could benefit firms that misclassify their workers).
162 42 C.F.R. § 406.5 (describing Medicare eligibility requirements, including that an applicant be at
least sixty-five years of age).
163 Medicare is an “entitlement”; it offers a benefit (health insurance) to everyone who is legally
entitled to it by meeting the program’s eligibility criteria. In contrast, nonentitlement programs, such as
low-income housing assistance, often lack the funding to provide benefits to everyone who is
eligible. Compare William Gittins, Is Medicare Considered an Entitlement Program?, AS USA (June 1,
2022, 9:34 PM), https://en.as.com/latest_news/is-medicare-considered-an-entitlement-program-n/
[https://perma.cc/5X93-VAPN] (classifying Medicare as an entitlement program), with Edgar O. Olsen,
Housing Programs for Low-Income Households, in MEANS-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS IN THE
UNITED STATES 365, 366 (Robert A. Moffitt ed., 2003) (noting that the real cost of low-income housing
exceeds the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s investment).
164 KFF, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2021 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
4 (2021),
https://www.kff.org/report-section/ehbs-2021-summary-of-findings/ [https://perma.cc/NXW5-M5X8]
(noting that 59% of all firms offer some health benefits).
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group health insurance coverage through their employer at age sixty-five,
they become eligible for Medicare on top of their existing insurance.165
Medicare’s rules state that when a person is covered by a group health
plan and also eligible for Medicare, the determination of which insurance
plan pays first for any medical expense is determined based on the firm’s
size. Specifically, if a firm has twenty or more full-time employees, the
firm’s group health plan must pay the worker’s medical expenses first, with
Medicare covering the remainder.166 In contrast, if a firm has fewer than
twenty full-time employees, Medicare becomes an employee’s primary
payer.167
This distinction in Medicare’s eligibility rules based on firm size has
significant implications for a firm’s finances. Older employees are, on
average, more expensive to insure than younger employees.168 Consequently,
whether a firm is large enough to self-insure or whether it purchases
insurance from a private company on its employees’ behalf, the premiums
that the firm must pay are higher the older its covered employees are.169 For
small firms, the cost of retaining an employee who turns sixty-five declines
significantly, as the firm is not required to provide that employee health
insurance coverage and can require that she obtain Medicare coverage
instead.170 Large firms, on the other hand, cannot force older employees to
disenroll from the group health plan even though they have an alternative
insurance option in Medicare.171 Therefore, large firms close to the threshold

165 See Original Medicare (Part A and B) Eligibility and Enrollment, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (Dec. 1, 2021, 7:02 PM), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Eligibility-andEnrollment/OrigMedicarePartABEligEnrol [https://perma.cc/MYY2-CRDL].
166 42 U.S.C. § 411.100 (describing the conditions under which Medicare is the secondary payer).
167 See id.
168 See Matthew Rae, Cynthia Cox, Krutika Amin & Tricia Neuman, How Lowering the Medicare
Eligibility Age Might Affect Employer-Sponsored Insurance Costs, PETERSON-KFF HEALTH SYS.
TRACKER (Apr. 27, 2021), https://www.healthsystemtracker.org/brief/how-lowering-the-medicareeligibility-age-might-affect-employer-sponsored-insurance-costs/
[https://perma.cc/2US2-RPBT]
(discussing how older employees account for a disproportionate amount of insurance costs to employers).
169 The size of the firm’s financial incentive will depend on the marginal premiums paid for older
workers as well as the extent to which the savings from regulatory arbitrage are “passed-through.” See
Heikki Marjosola, The Problem of Regulatory Arbitrage: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective,
15 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 388, 388 (2021) (discussing firms’ strategies of minimizing costs by
avoiding regulations that apply by providing the market an economically similar good that is not subject
to regulations).
170 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1)(A)(ii) (setting out the exception to the secondary-payer policy for
firms with fewer than twenty employees).
171 Can My Employer Force Me to Enroll in Medicare at Age 65?, SIXTY-FIVE INC. (Mar. 3, 2020),
https://www.65incorporated.com/topics/enrolling-medicare/can-employer-can-my-insurance-when-iturn-65/ [https://perma.cc/7X3U-REAS] (explaining that an employee at a large firm who turns 65 cannot
be forced off of the employer plan, even if they are eligible for Medicare).
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face a sharp financial incentive to induce their older employees to disenroll
from the group health plan and be primarily insured through Medicare.172
One way in which large firms may respond to this financial incentive is
by reclassifying an older employee as an independent contractor. Typically,
group health plans that cover a firm’s employees do not also provide
coverage to nonemployee workers, including contractors.173 Reclassifying an
employee, therefore, allows the firm to lower its health insurance premiums
while still retaining a potentially valuable and highly experienced worker.
B. Firms’ Financial Incentives and Workers’ Classification
In order to determine the financial incentives faced by large firms to
reclassify older employees as contractors, we must identify a comparison
group of firms and workers that are otherwise similar, but where the same
incentives are absent. Simply comparing older and younger workers at large
firms is unlikely to provide a reliable estimate of the impact of these
incentives; apart from Medicare eligibility, many other changes occur when
a worker turns sixty-five. For example, for many years, the age at which
workers could claim full Social Security retirement benefits was sixty-five.174
By distinguishing between small and large firms, the Medicare
eligibility rules provide a natural comparison group. Employees at small
firms who turn sixty-five also become eligible for Medicare, in addition to
experiencing any other changes that occur at that age. The only meaningful
distinction between employees at small firms and those at large firms is the
absence of an incentive for firms to reclassify the former as contractors to
avoid paying higher health insurance premiums.
The empirical approach I use to estimate the effect of an employee
becoming relatively more costly is known as difference-in-differences
(DD).175 The DD estimate of the effect, 𝜋 𝐷𝐷 , can be represented by two
differences in the probability of an employee being reclassified as a
contractor (𝐿):

172 See Luis Garicano, Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen, Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity
Distribution: Evidence from France, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 3439, 3443 (2016) (finding that, in France,
there is a distortion to the distribution of firm size where firms close to a regulatory size threshold “bunch
up” below it, along with a drastic reduction in firms just over the threshold).
173 See 26 U.S.C. § 105(g) (excluding certain statutory employees, like self-employed workers, from
coverage).
174 42 U.S.C. § 1382c. But see Patrick J. Purcell, Employment at Older Ages and Social Security
Benefit Claiming, 76 SOC. SEC. BULL. 1, 11–12 (2016) (suggesting that for some workers, the Social
Security Amendments of 1983 and the Senior Citizens’ Freedom to Work Act of 2000 worked in
conjunction to effectively transform the full retirement age from sixty-five to sixty-six in 2000).
175 See Bruce D. Meyer, Natural and Quasi-Experiments in Economics, 13 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT.
151, 154–56 (1995) (providing an extended discussion of natural experimental methods).
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𝜋𝐷𝐷 = (𝐿𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒,𝑜𝑙𝑑 − 𝐿𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙,𝑜𝑙𝑑 ) − (𝐿𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒,𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔 − 𝐿𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙,𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔 )
The first difference is between the reclassification probabilities for
older workers in large and small firms. A naive empirical approach might
focus just on this difference, but it is susceptible to bias. For example, small
firms may predominantly be in industries where rates of reclassification are
higher relative to large firms. Failing to account for this difference would
yield a misleading result. Therefore, I subtract from this first difference a
second difference: between the reclassification probabilities for younger
workers in large and small firms.
To estimate this effect, I rely on a sample drawn from U.S. tax filings
that is distinct from the one used in the descriptive analysis described earlier
in Part III. In this causal analysis sample (Table 4), I am interested in
observing the classification transitions of workers within the same firm as
those workers approach and pass the age of sixty-five. Because a worker’s
likelihood of being employed at sixty-five may be influenced by the
phenomenon I am interested in studying, I construct the causal sample by
starting with a group of workers who are employed at age sixty. To
distinguish between employees at firms that do and do not face a financial
incentive to reclassify at or after age sixty-five, I use information about the
employee’s firm at age sixty. Though it is certainly possible that an employee
may leave that firm before age sixty-five, most workers employed by a firm
at age sixty remain with that firm as they approach sixty-five.176

176 From 2010 to 2020, worker tenure rose with age, with the fifty-five to sixty-four demographic
and the 65 and older demographic maintaining tenure at their respective workplaces for approximately
ten or more years. News Release, Bureau of Lab. Stat., Employee Tenure in 2020, at 5 (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/tenure.pdf [https://perma.cc/CY37-3SU3]. But see NELA
RICHARDSON & SARA KLEIN, ADP RSCH. INST., PEOPLE AT WORK 2021: A GLOBAL WORKFORCE VIEW
24–25 (2021), https://www.adpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Updated_WFV-Global_2021_US_
Screen_697691_162389_FV.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG5G-J52G] (suggesting that the COVID-19
pandemic has led older workers to be “most open to the idea of shifting into contract work”).

804

117:731 (2022)

Independent Contractors in Law and in Fact

TABLE 4: CAUSAL ANALYSIS SAMPLE SUMMARY STATISTICS

Cohort

Sampled
Employees

Average
Wage

Median
Firm Size

Median Firm
Average
Wage

% in HighWage
Firms

% in HighCost HSAs

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Small Firms (< 10 W-2s)
2005

3,326

52,691

4

21,555

44

53

2006

3,942

63,177

4

23,403

46

51

2007

4,319

55,936

4

23,141

44

50

2008

4,068

51,680

4

23,841

43

50

Large Firms (>50 W-2s)
2005

20,838

56,100

2,456

24,860

52

50

2006

25,065

64,026

2,486

25,772

51

50

2007

28,115

59,098

2,586

26,984

52

50

2008
26,297
58,045
2,690
28,540
52
49
Note. Causal analysis sample comprises individuals employed at age sixty and observed through age seventy.
Small firms are defined as those issuing Forms W-2 to fewer than ten individuals. Large firms are defined
as those issuing Forms W-2 to more than fifty individuals. Cohorts are defined based on the tax year when
an employee turned sixty.

In addition to knowing which firm employed the worker at age sixty, I
also know, in most cases, the zip code in which a worker lived. Using this
information, I am able to gather, from the Dartmouth Atlas Project, annual
data on per-patient Medicare expenditures in the hospital service area (HSA)
in which a worker lived. As is well-documented, Medicare expenditures for
the same procedure, even after adjusting for a patient’s age, race, and sex,
vary significantly across the country.177 This variation is likely to influence
firms’ group health insurance premiums as well, making the financial
incentives for large firms to reclassify older employees greater in high-cost
areas than in low-cost areas. I incorporate this cost variation into the analysis.
A significant limitation of the tax-filings data is that I am unable to
determine the number of full-time employees that a firm has in a given tax
year. This is important because the Medicare eligibility rule turns on whether
a firm has twenty or more full-time employees. To overcome this limitation
in my data—and reduce the possibility that the firms I identify as “large”
may actually be small firms not facing this financial incentive, and vice
177 See, e.g., Joseph P. Newhouse & Alan M. Garber, Geographic Variation in Medicare Services,
368 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1465, 1467 (2013) (showing a total spending range of at least $300).
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versa—I err on the side of caution and exclude from the analysis any
employee working for a firm at age sixty that issued between ten and fifty
Forms W-2. This conservative approach divides the sample into employees
working for large firms (> 50 W-2s) that are very likely to face the incentive,
and employees working for small firms (< 10 W-2s) that almost certainly
are not.
Using the causal analysis sample, I estimate the following model to
recover the DD estimate, 𝜋 𝐷𝐷 :
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛽1 𝑋𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋 𝐷𝐷 𝑋𝑗 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡

(1)

The dependent variable, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 , is a binary variable equal to 1
if worker 𝑖, who was employed at firm 𝑗 at the age of sixty and living in state
𝑠, transitions from being an employee to an independent contractor with firm
𝑗 in tax year 𝑡. I am interested in whether a worker is more likely to make
this transition after she turns sixty-five and if she worked at a large firm. I
control for factors common to all workers in the sample within a given tax
year (𝛾𝑡 ) or from a given state (𝛾𝑠 ). To identify and account for persistent
differences among large firms, I control for a binary variable equal to 1 if
firm 𝑗 issued Forms W-2 to more than fifty distinct individuals (𝑋𝑗 = 1) or
if it issued forms to fewer than ten (𝑋𝑗 = 0). The binary variable 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is equal
to 1 if worker 𝑖 is at or above age sixty-five in tax year 𝑡. Finally, the DD
estimate of the effect, 𝜋 𝐷𝐷 , is the coefficient on a binary variable equal to 1
if a worker is sixty-five or older and if they were employed for a large firm
at age sixty.
C. Evidence of Cost-Motivated Substitution Toward Contractors
The results of the DD estimation from Equation 1 are reported in
column 1 of Table 5. Compared to older employees at small firms, older
employees at large firms are 0.08 percentage points more likely during a
given year to transition from receiving a Form W-2 from a firm to receiving
a Form 1099-MISC from the same firm after turning sixty-five. This estimate
is statistically significant (𝑝 = 0.001). To understand the magnitude of this
estimate, an employee aged sixty-five and older at a small firm has a 0.27
percent probability of being reclassified as a contractor in any given year;
therefore, a 0.08 percentage point increase amounts to a 30% greater
likelihood of reclassification each year for similar workers at large firms.
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TABLE 5: EFFECT OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVES ON FIRMS’ WORKER CLASSIFICATION DECISIONS

Estimate

DD: Older Employees at
Large Firms

DDD: Older Employees at
Large Firms in HighMedical-Cost HSAs

DDD: Older Employees at
Large Firms Paying High
Wages

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.000834***

0.0001154

-0.0002173

(0.0002625)

(0.0009873)

(0.000514)

N
1,275,670
1,075,701
1,275,670
Note. Coefficient estimates from difference-in-differences (DD) or triple-difference (DDD) model reported.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p< 0 .05, *** p < 0.01

A different way to estimate the same effect is to do so separately by a
worker’s age, instead of considering all workers aged sixty-five and older
together. Doing this allows me to observe whether there are any dynamic
patterns in the ages at which workers may be reclassified as they reach and
exceed the age of sixty-five. However, because it requires estimating the
relative likelihood of reclassification separately at multiple ages rather than
once for a range of ages as with the DD estimation, these estimates are less
precise.178 This approach, called an event study, requires estimating a slightly
different model:

𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛽1 𝑋𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝑍𝑖𝑡
(2)

70

+

∑

𝜋𝑎𝐷𝐷 𝑋𝑗 𝟏[𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎] + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡

𝑎=60,𝑎≠64

The event study coefficients of interest, 𝜋𝑎𝐷𝐷 , compare workers of age
𝑎 in large and small firms. The estimate for age sixty-four, just prior to
attaining Medicare eligibility, is omitted, and all estimates presented are

178 In statistical analysis, there is frequently a trade-off between “precision,” namely, the exact
numerical value of the effect, and “confidence,” or the distance between the upper and lower bound values
within the estimated effect lies. If we estimate the effect by age, rather than as a combined effect across
two age bins (namely, before and after age 65), there are fewer observations used to estimate each
coefficient. If we hold fixed the confidence level at 95%, the smaller number of observations (lower Ns)
resulting from creating a bin for each age reduces the accuracy of each point estimate compared to the
specification in which the observations are pooled together before and after the age threshold.
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relative to this age.179 The results of this approach are shown in Figure 17.
Beginning at age sixty-five, most of the point estimates are positive,
suggesting a higher probability of being reclassified from an employee to a
contractor. Only the estimate at age sixty-six is statistically significant at the
95% confidence level, suggesting that the likelihood of an older worker at a
large firm being reclassified was particularly high in the year immediately
after it may have become financially advantageous to do so.

179 In an event study, a single “lag” or “lead” variable must be omitted to avoid collinearity. All
estimates capture differences relative to this omitted variable. It is convention when estimating event
study specifications to omit the first lag variable, which in this case corresponds to age sixty-four. The
resulting age-specific estimates are therefore interpreted as changes in the likelihood of reclassification
relative to the likelihood at age sixty-four.
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FIGURE 17: TRANSITION FROM EMPLOYEE TO CONTRACTOR STATUS IN RESPONSE TO WORKER
MEDICARE ELIGIBILITY
Panel A: Transition from Employee to Contractor Within Same Firm
Small
Small
Firms
firms

Transitioning
Fraction transitioning

.004

.003

Large
Large
firms
Firms

.002

.001
60

61

62

63

64

65
Age

66

67

68

69

70

Panel B: Coefficient Estimates

Study
Event
estimate
coefficient Estimate
studyCoefficient
Event

.003

.002

.001

0

-.001
60

61

62

63

64

65
Age

66

67

68

69

70

Note. Panel A shows the mean rate of transition from employee to contractor within the same firm, plotted
separately by firm size. The sample has five cohorts, drawn by taking a random 10% sample in each tax year
2005 to 2008 of all employee relationships in which the employee (payee) turned age sixty during that tax
year. While the sample of individuals in large firms is much larger than those in small firms, there is an
obvious increase in transitions to contractors for the same firm at age sixty-six, the year after the first year
the employee is eligible for Medicare. Panel B shows the coefficient estimates for an event-study
specification analogous to the classic difference-in-differences but estimated separately for each age. There
is a statistically significant increase in the probability of a transition just after when the worker at a large firm
turns 65. This suggests that, at least on the margin, firms may respond to regulatory cost pressures by
reclassifying workers.
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Finally, I also consider two additional sources of variation that may bear
on the degree of financial incentive faced by firms. The first, as described
above, is geographic variation in the cost of medical care across the United
States. To leverage this variation, I estimate a modified version of Equation
1, known as a triple-difference (DDD) estimator:
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛽1 𝑋𝑗 + 𝛽2 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑇𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑋𝑗 𝑍𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5 𝑋𝑗 𝑇𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽6 𝑍𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑠𝑡 + 𝜋 𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑋𝑗 𝑍𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑡

(3)

In this model, I additionally control for whether the rate of per-patient
Medicare expenditures in a worker’s hospital service area (HSA) is above
(𝑇𝑠𝑡 = 1) or below (𝑇𝑠𝑡 = 0) the median during that tax year. The coefficient
of interest, 𝜋 𝐷𝐷𝐷 , yields the effect estimate across three dimensions of
comparison: older versus younger workers, large versus small firms, and
high versus low healthcare cost areas. I also estimate a variant of Equation 3
where the third difference is replaced by a comparison between firms with
average wages above or below the median during that tax year, under the
theory that higher wage firms are more likely to offer group health plans to
their employees and thus face a greater incentive to reclassify older workers
as contractors.
The results of the DDD estimation from Equation 3 are reported in
columns 2 and 3 of Table 5, supra. Unlike the DD estimates in column 1,
neither of these results is statistically significantly different from zero.
Introducing an additional dimension of difference, as the DDD specification
does over that of the DD, can help estimate the effect of interest provided it
is greater for firms in high medical cost areas (column 2) or that pay higher
wages (column 3). However, introducing an additional dimension of
difference also requires estimating additional parameters beyond that of a
DD specification and, therefore, can yield estimates that are less precise, as
appears to be the case here.
While statistically significant and tightly estimated, the results from the
main specification translate into a modest effect on the population of workers
as a whole: back-of-the-envelope calculations indicate that the Medicare
payment incentive results in the reclassification of a few hundred thousand
workers per year out of a U.S. labor force of close to 160 million.180

180 This estimate was obtained by extrapolating the effect found in the sample data to the total U.S.
working population, as proxied for by the number of W-2 recipients in 2016.
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In addition, the magnitude of the effect belies its importance to the
broader inquiry: the monetary value of the Medicare incentive to firms is
modest—on average, firms save approximately $16,000 to $20,000 per
misclassified worker181—so we should expect a correspondingly small
change in behavior. However, there are many other, larger financial
incentives where the effect on a firm’s classification choices is more difficult
to observe. For example, the ACA only requires firms to offer insurance if
the firm employs more than fifty employees.182 This cutoff creates a strong
financial incentive to reclassify the fifty-first worker as an independent
contractor, as triggering the mandate could result in hundreds of thousands
of dollars in additional cost because firms are required to offer insurance to
all employees. If firms respond to the Medicare age cutoff by reclassifying
workers, it seems likely that they would also respond to much larger
incentives that exist elsewhere in the tax system.
D. Caveats
Several caveats to this analysis are worth noting. First, as I mentioned
previously, I am unable to directly observe whether a firm is subject to the
Medicare eligibility rule concerning large firms because I cannot measure
the number of full-time employees that a firm has. I adopt a very
conservative approach here in focusing on large firms that issue Forms W-2
to more than fifty distinct individuals, but in doing so I also discard data from
many firms closer to the true threshold, reducing the statistical precision of
my estimates.
Second, while I attempt to use additional sources of variation to more
precisely identify a set of firms for which the financial incentives to
reclassify will be greatest, these measures are also imperfect. Medicare
expenditures present an imperfect proxy for the cost of the private health
insurance plans that firms often purchase for their employees. Similarly, I
am unable to directly observe whether firms offered health insurance to their

181

The savings to the firm from reclassifying a sixty-four-year-old as an independent contractor will
depend on (1) the premium cost for that individual employee and (2) the reduction in the firm’s premium
(for all of its employees) because it now has a younger workforce. Premium costs generally increase with
employee age; the current premium cost per employee for firms with 75% of employees over age 50
ranges from approximately $16,000 (employee-plus-one) to $20,000 (family plan). See Philip F. Cooper
& Karen E. Davis, Statistical Brief #527: Premiums and Employee Contributions to Employer-Sponsored
Health Insurance by Workforce Age and Firm Size, Private Industry, 2018, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE
RSCH. & QUALITY: MEDICAL EXPENDITURE PANEL SURVEY (Nov. 2019), https://meps.ahrq.gov/
data_files/publications/st527/stat527.shtml [https://perma.cc/SAC6-M3F8].
182 26 U.S.C. § 4980H; RICHARD CAUCHI, ACA REQUIREMENTS FOR MEDIUM AND LARGE
EMPLOYERS TO OFFER HEALTH COVERAGE 1–2 (2016) https://www.ncsl.org/documents/health/
aca_requirements_for_employers.pdf [https://perma.cc/N38X-GCQ2].
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employees, and instead rely on whether a firm’s average employee
compensation was above the median during that year as a proxy for this.183
Despite these limitations, this analysis provides evidence that firms are
swayed in their decision of how to classify some workers—in this case, older
employees at large firms—by the relative costs of employees and
contractors.
VI. POLICY DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR TAX TREATMENT
The income tax system’s disparate treatment of contractors and
employees is justified by the implicit assumption that meaningful differences
exist between the labor each type of worker performs.184 But the results
presented here suggest that such differences may be much less meaningful
now than they were previously. If this is true, then the implicit assumption
justifying the tax system’s disparate treatment of contractors and employees
is significantly weakened, and maintaining this increasingly arbitrary
distinction between types of workers—and treating them differently because
of it—may exacerbate equity concerns.
More generally, one might ask whether continuing to sort and
differentially treat workers using the control standard promotes the
objectives of the U.S. federal income tax system. In this Part, I discuss the
control standard with respect to the fundamental normative values in tax law:
equity and efficiency. My analysis proceeds in two phases. First, I consider
the desirability of the control standard over the long term in Section VI.A—
what economists refer to as the “first best” policy solution. In this “first best”
world, I argue that the control standard has outlived its usefulness and should
be excised from the federal tax code. Second, given that the prevalence of
the control standard throughout the Code renders its abandonment legally,
economically, and politically infeasible, I consider the best policy options in
the short term in Section VI.B.
A. The Control Standard in the Long Run
First, let us consider the utility of the control standard “de novo”—i.e.,
from the perspective of a policymaker designing the U.S. income tax system
183 With the exception of unionized positions, low-wage positions do not include health insurance
program access. See BOWEN GARRETT, LEN M. NICHOLS & EMILY K. GREENMAN, URB. INST., WORKERS
WITHOUT HEALTH INSURANCE: WHO ARE THEY AND HOW CAN POLICY REACH THEM? 11–15 (2001),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/61271/310244-Workers-Without-HealthInsurance.PDF [https://perma.cc/X6AF-A2NM] (showing an increase in employer-sponsored healthcare
with wage increases).
184 Cf. David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 43,
43 (2006) (defining “horizontal equity” as a characteristic of a tax system in which similarly situated
taxpayers receive the same tax treatment).

812

117:731 (2022)

Independent Contractors in Law and in Fact

from scratch and thus unconstrained by precedent or legal path dependence.
This exercise is helpful for clarifying the ultimate direction reform should
take in the long run, when there is sufficient time for actors to adjust, and the
immediate constraints faced by policymakers can be relaxed.
At a high level of generality, the objectives of the income tax system
are to ensure the government can collect income tax revenue in a timely
manner, equitably, efficiently, and while minimizing the compliance burden
on taxpayers. Equity may refer to either vertical equity or horizontal equity.
Vertical equity requires taxpayers who make more to have higher tax liability
than those who make less. Horizontal equity requires similarly situated
taxpayers to pay the same amount of tax. In tax analysis, an efficient tax
policy is one that achieves its goal while creating the smallest possible
deviation in behavior from that which would have occurred absent the tax.
Put another way, a tax is efficient if, among all rules that achieve the same
outcome, the rule minimizes distortion relative to the world without
the tax.185
Of course, it is not always possible to satisfy both equity and efficiency
simultaneously. Frequently, policies that affirm one value undermine the
other.186 Tax policies that incorporate the control standard, for example, are
likely to result in either highly inefficient or highly inequitable outcomes.
Consider the threshold Medicare-reimbursement rule studied in Part V. How
this rule affects equity and efficiency depends on whether firms’ greater use
of independent contractors at the threshold is a result of reorganization or
misclassification.
First, assume this change reflects a reorganization of the firm’s labor
inputs to rely more on contractors. Such a rule then meets the definition of
equity,187 but the efficiency costs of reorganization in response to the
threshold are considerable. If we assume, as seems reasonable, that a firm
had optimally organized its labor inputs to maximize profit prior to the
policy, then any reorganization as the result of triggering the threshold under
the policy will lower profitability.

185 Note that efficiency is not desirable when the object is to distort consumption that is socially
harmful, as is the case with cigarette taxes.
186 A classic example is the discussion of income-tax progressivity. While increasing the average tax
rate based on income creates a system in which low-income earners keep a larger percentage of their
after-tax income (which many view as essential in achieving a more just distribution of resources), such
an increase theoretically discourages higher earners from working (in that it distorts their value for a
marginal hour of leisure versus work).
187 In which firms using roughly equivalent labor inputs (i.e., division of tasks between contractors
and employees), and workers performing similar tasks in a similar manner are entitled to the same
protections and are treated similarly by the tax code.
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Alternatively, assume this change reflects the firm misclassifying
employees as contractors to remain below the threshold. Such a rule then
imposes minimal efficiency costs, as nothing about the firm’s production
process changes. However, because the firm now faces a different tax
liability than another firm that uses identical labor inputs but does not
misclassify, this rule undermines equity.
An even simpler illustration of the inadequacy of the control standard
is that of federal income tax withholding from employee wages but not from
contractor payments.188 The goal of withholding—to ensure that the
government can collect income tax revenue in a timely manner—is balanced
against two constraints: first, withholding an amount that accurately reflects
tax liability at the end of the year, and second, minimizing the compliance
burden on taxpayers.189 In theory, contractors are exempted from withholding
because they have substantial cost of business (COB) deductions, meaning
that their gross income diverges from their taxable, or net, income, making
it costly for firms to accurately calculate their tax liability. In addition,
platonic contractors work for many firms in a single tax period, further
complicating accurate tax withholding by any single payer.190 In contrast,
platonic employees work for a single firm, making the cost of accurate tax
withholding manageable for employers. Control over performance per se
does not determine whether withholding is optimal. Rather, it is assumed to
be correlated with characteristics that do influence the feasibility and costs
of firm withholding (i.e., number of payers and amount of deductions).
But if the true nature of contractors’ work and their relationships to
firms are converging with those of employees, then the rationale for treating
employees and contractors differently for income-tax purposes may no
longer hold. For example, the median contractor now provides labor to two
firms, the same number as the median employee. Further, firms are now
required to report contractor payments to the government, and these firms
often have employees on whose behalf they already withhold and remit
income taxes. The additional cost of withholding on contractor income,
given the firms already track and report it, seems like a low compliance
burden. Finally, contractors are claiming fewer COB deductions, thereby
minimizing the expected gap between their gross and net income and making
their tax liability easier to forecast.
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First introduced by Congress in the Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, ch. 120, 57 Stat. 126.
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For that matter, does sorting workers based on the level of control
exercised over them in the course of performance advance the purported
objective? If the concern is revenue collection, why not sort workers based
on how much they are paid? Imagine a rule that exempts workers from
withholding if they are paid less than some nominal amount. This seems far
more likely to minimize revenue loss.
Recent legal scholarship concerning the particular needs of platform
firms and the workers who provide services through them—the gig
economy—offers several alternatives to the status-quo treatment of workers
by the income tax system. Thomas notes that platform firms are particularly
attractive for solving the withholding problem, as they offer a centralized
point at which income taxes can be withheld from the earnings of contractors
who use the platform.191 She also argues for the creation of a standardized
COB deduction that would partially alleviate the compliance costs currently
imposed on contractors by having to itemize.192 Oei and Ring consider the
potential tax-administration consequences of reclassifying platform firm
workers as employees, arguing that doing so might enhance transparency and
the salience of after-tax wages (because employees cannot deduct COB
expenses).193 Though these suggestions are made in the context of the gig
economy, they pertain to contractor income more generally.
A different approach that maintains the binary classification scheme is
elective worker classification, or a “check-the-box” system. Under such an
approach, workers self-select into whichever form of labor is more
advantageous, regardless of the nature of their work or relationship to a firm,
similarly to how firms have several options for which legal form they take.194
To an extent, this may already be happening, as the ambiguity in some
industries and jobs makes the appropriate classification unclear.
But this raises the question, why are we classifying workers based on
the control standard for tax purposes at all? What policy objectives does this
sorting help us achieve? As in the example of withholding, in most tax
contexts the degree of control seems, at best, orthogonal to the purpose of
the underlying tax rule. At worst, it can be used to undermine the policy’s
objective.
Consider the ACA, which requires certain firms to offer health
insurance to employees but not contractors. Ostensibly, the goal of the ACA
191
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194 See, e.g., IRS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORM-8832: ENTITY CLASSIFICATION ELECTION 2
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is to enhance access to affordable health insurance. But a worker’s need for
affordable health insurance is not related to the amount of control to which
they are subject. Excluding contractors merely creates a strong price
incentive for firms to shift their workforce composition towards contractors
to avoid the costs of providing health insurance.
B. The Control Standard in the Short Run
Given the ubiquity of the control standard in tax and other areas of
federal law, what can the IRS do to mitigate disparate treatment of similar
workers? Even if one agrees that the control standard should be deemphasized or eliminated in the long run, the binary distinction between
employees and contractors is so prevalent in current tax law that ripping it
out root and stem would be immensely costly in the short run.
Several suggestions have been made on this point. One is to harmonize
the tests used across federal agencies to determine a worker’s appropriate
classification. This would facilitate coordination and allow the pooling of
enforcement resources.
Another suggestion is to avoid designing laws that sharply change how
firms and workers are treated depending on whether a firm’s number of
employees exceeds one or more specific thresholds. Such laws create strong
localized incentives for firms near these thresholds either to change how they
classify the marginal worker or to reorganize their labor inputs to stay to one
side of the threshold. To mitigate these distortions, legislation could
gradually phase in any incentive or penalty that is contingent on a firm’s size.
A prominent example of this is the Earned Income Tax Credit, a wage
subsidy that features both a “phase-in” region where the subsidy grows as
wages increase and a “phase-out” region where the subsidy diminishes
before ultimately disappearing once wages exceed a threshold.
An analogous design for the Medicare rule or the ACA would see small
employers pay a percentage of the healthcare costs of their employees. This
percentage would “phase in” to 100% as the number of employees grew to
reach a certain threshold. Designing size-based regulations this way is
particularly attractive when those subjected can readily manipulate the
variable upon which they are based, and any such manipulation is difficult
to detect, as is the case with worker classification. Of course, this type of
design increases the complexity of the law and tends to raise compliance
costs. However, given the increasing frequency with which small firms rely
on payroll services, this may prove less burdensome than initially feared.
While not an exhaustive list, these incremental reforms may reduce the
disparate treatment of economically similar workers based on how they are
classified until the larger system of binary classification can be reconsidered.
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CONCLUSION
How individuals providing services to firms are classified has
significant implications. Workers’ tax treatment and labor protections, and
firms’ regulatory compliance costs, all depend on whether a worker is
classified as an employee or as an independent contractor. Yet until now, we
have lacked the data to measure how this distinction applies in practice.
The findings presented here suggest that employee and contractor
relationships increasingly resemble each other, particularly for low-income
workers. Most workers who enter employee or contractor relationships do so
with only one or a handful of firms, and they depend on this limited set of
payers for most of their income. This runs contrary to the commonly held
belief that contractors provide services to many firms; though certainly true
for a subset of workers, it is far from representative of contractors as a whole.
Likewise, although employee relationships exhibit greater durability and
income stability, this gap has narrowed substantially since 2001, as the
persistence of contractor relationships has increased while their
compensation volatility has decreased. The similarity between employee and
contractor relationships—and the arbitrariness of the distinction between the
two—is most pronounced among low-income workers.
Furthermore, firms’ decisions about how to classify workers appear to
be influenced by factors outside of those found in the balancing tests,
including the relative regulatory cost of employees and contractors. Using a
natural experiment created by Medicare eligibility rules that differentially
affects the cost of retaining older employees among small and large firms, I
find that an older employee is more likely to be reclassified as a contractor
with the same employer if the firm faces a greater financial incentive to do
so. This finding has implications for regulations that change the cost
differential between employees and contractors. Firms may respond to such
regulations by shifting toward one classification or the other, either by
manipulating workers’ classification (an evasion response) or by materially
reconfiguring their production process to satisfy the requirements of
multifactor balancing tests (a real response). Either response is undesirable:
the first violates basic horizontal equity principles, while the second distorts
behavior away from what would have been optimal absent the regulatory
change.
The descriptive findings presented here suggest potentially significant
structural changes in the labor market and are timely in light of ongoing
policy discussions around the gig economy. However, due to limitations in
the data I can analyze, they are not dispositive. As I detail in Part IV, several
hypotheses may—separately or jointly—explain the convergence detected in
the U.S. tax filings data that I study. Resolving this lingering uncertainty will
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require additional empirical investigation. Specifically, we must invest in
better methods of data collection that can document the true nature of
worker–firm relationships, which would allow us to directly measure, rather
than merely infer, whether the substance of those relationships has changed
over time, and for whom. This improved data collection must take particular
care to sample low-income workers engaged in employee and contractor
relationships, as these workers have experienced the greatest degree of
apparent convergence. Furthermore, qualitative data collection from firms
about how they make worker classification determinations would
complement the kind of natural experiments I use here to study firm
behavior.
Though the major contributions of this paper are positive, in closing, I
return briefly to the normative literature on how (and when) the law should
impose discrete categories upon a continuum of transactions. In his
influential early article in this literature, Professor David Weisbach warns
against the use of “platonic notions” as the basis for drawing tax lines.195
Such an exercise, he says, results in lines that lack normative content and do
not advance any of the substantive goals of the tax system.196 Instead, he
advocates evaluating policy solutions on the basis of efficiency, where a
contemplated line is most efficient if it minimally distorts individuals’
behavior.197 Many of the examples of lines in the tax law that he cites fail to
meet this criterion, in part because the lines often rely on factors that are easy
to manipulate, thereby inducing precisely the behavioral change we hope to
avoid.
His primary example of outmoded line drawing—the four-factor test
distinguishing partnerships and corporations—bears more than a passing
resemblance to the tax law’s current twenty-factor test distinguishing
contractors and employees. In that instance, the doctrinal ideas
distinguishing a partnership from a corporation—for example, lack of central
management and an unlimited life—were codified only to discover that these
characteristics describing a platonic notion of organizational structure are, in
fact, malleable and responsive to the drawing of the line.198 Even to the extent
that characteristics describing a platonic notion are based in seemingly
unyielding economic fundamentals, these fundamentals, one day, must
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waver; over time, large structural changes will occur that render lines based
on yesterday’s platonic notions obsolete.
Today, the platonic notions of employees and contractors embodied in
the existing lines separating the two are fading as the barriers to selfemployment lower and fundamental changes are made in laws governing
taxes and social insurance. And with further upheaval in the labor market,
technological change on the horizon, and a society unsure whether efficiency
is still the paramount criteria and equity the ancillary, one thing is clear: any
alternative lines for these two groups will be drawn in shifting sand.
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